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THE OECD’S CALL FOR AN END TO 
“CORROSIVE” FACILITATION PAYMENTS AND 
THE INTERNATIONAL FOCUS ON THE 
FACILITATION PAYMENTS EXCEPTION UNDER 
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
Jon Jordan* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On October 15, 2010, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (―OECD‖), the leading economic organization of the 
world, issued a report on the United States criticizing its foreign anti-
bribery policies regarding facilitation payments.
1
  Facilitation or ―grease‖ 
payments, small bribes designed to expedite the performance of routine 
governmental actions, have always been allowed under the United States‘ 
foreign anti-bribery statute, the Foreign Corruption Practices Act 
 
 *  Mr. Jordan is a Senior Investigations Counsel with the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Unit of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (―SEC‖).  Mr. Jordan has 
held various positions in the SEC‘s Miami and Washington D.C. offices, most recently 
serving as a Branch Chief.  The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, 
disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees.  
The views expressed herein, including views regarding the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(―FCPA‖) Unit and the Commission‘s FCPA program, are those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the Commission, the Commission‘s FCPA Unit, or of the 
author‘s colleagues upon the staff of the Commission. 
 1. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], United States: Phase 3, Report on 
Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions and the 2009 Revised Recommendation on Combating 
Bribery in International Business Transactions, at 22-24, (Oct. 15, 2010) [hereinafter 
Phase 3 Report], available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/49/46213841.pdf.  The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (―OECD‖) is an international 
organization consisting of thirty-three member countries with the mission of coordinating 
domestic and international policies in furtherance of providing a better world economy, 
promoting economic growth and development, and contributing to world trade.  Information 
about the OECD, including its mission with respect to the world economy, is available at 
http://www.oecd.org. 
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(―FCPA‖).
2
  The OECD has also always allowed for ―small‖ facilitation 
payments in its foreign anti-bribery treaty, the Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
(―OECD Anti-Bribery Convention‖ or ―Convention‖).
3
  But in November 
2009, the OECD changed its tune and called on all signatory nations to the 
Convention to end the permissibility of ―corrosive‖ facilitation payments in 
its Recommendation for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials 
(―OECD Recommendation‖).
4
  This call by the OECD placed it in 
disagreement with the United States over the issue of facilitation payments, 
and these divergent views came to a head in October 2010 when the OECD 
criticized the United States for its policies on facilitation payments in a 
report on the country‘s implementation of the OECD Recommendation.
5
 
 The OECD‘s recent actions, as well as other international non-
governmental calls for ending facilitation payments, have put the United 
States under strong international pressure to change its policies regarding 
facilitation payments.  This would require amending the FCPA to change 
or eliminate its controversial facilitation payments exception, a difficult 
 
 2.   Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(a), (dd), (ff), (m) (2010)) [hereinafter FCPA].  See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78dd-1(b), -2(b), -3(b) (2010) (providing exceptions to the FCPA‘s otherwise stringent 
prohibitions for ―any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official, political party, 
or party official the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine 
governmental action . . . .‖).  Legislators and others often refer to small bribes acting as 
facilitation payments as ―grease‖ payments as such payments are intended to ―lubricate‖ the 
―wheels‖ that ―bureaucratic friction would otherwise grind to a halt.‖  Charles B. 
Weinograd, Clarifying Grease: Mitigating the Threat of Overdeterrence by Defining the 
Scope of the Routine Governmental Action Exception, 50 VA. J. INT‘L L. 509, 517 (2010); 
see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977) (explaining that the Unlawful Corporate 
Payments Act of 1977 did not extend its coverage to ―so-called grease or facilitating 
payments‖). 
 3. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997 (entered into force Feb. 15, 1999), 37 I.L.M. 1 
[hereinafter OECD Anti-Bribery Convention or Convention], at Commentary 9.  The OECD 
adopted the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 1997.  The Convention obligates signatory 
countries to enact domestic anti-bribery laws, similar to the FCPA, that criminalize the 
bribery of foreign officials.  Id., at art. 1. 
 4. See OECD Working Grp. on Bribery of Foreign Pub. Officials in Int‘l Bus. 
Transactions, Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, at 4 (Nov. 26, 2009) (amended Feb. 
18, 2010) [hereinafter OECD Recommendation], available at 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=C(2009)159/REV
1/FINAL&docLanguage=En (recommending that ―Member countries . . . undertake to 
periodically review their policies and approach on small facilitation payments . . . [and] 
encourage companies to prohibit or discourage the use of [such] payments . . . .‖). 
 5. Phase 3 Report, supra note 1, at 22-24. 
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task that would require congressional legislation at the very least.
6
  
Nevertheless, a growing distaste for facilitation payments, both 
domestically and internationally, in the modern-day anti-bribery era has 
signaled that the time may be ripe for the United States to revisit seriously 
the facilitation payments exception and consider eliminating it. 
This article will give a basic outline of the FCPA and the facilitation 
payments exception.  The article will then explore the history behind the 
exception.  The article will discuss the United States‘ pursuit of an 
international agreement prohibiting foreign bribery and the resulting OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention.  The article will then focus on international and 
domestic disdain over the issue of facilitation payments during the first 
decade of the Convention.  Next, the article will consider the recent OECD 
Recommendation calling on the prohibition of facilitation payments and the 
OECD‘s recent criticisms of the United States with respect to its policies 
on facilitation payments.  The author will then give his prediction that the 
facilitation payments exception will be eliminated.  Finally, the author will 
provide his recommendation that domestic companies prohibit the use of 
facilitation payments in the current global anti-bribery environment. 
II. THE FCPA 
 The FCPA was created in 1977 in response to findings by the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (―SEC‖) that numerous 
public companies had engaged in questionable payments overseas and 
falsified their accounting entries with respect to those payments in their 
books and records.
7
  The FCPA imposes civil and criminal liability for the 
bribery of foreign government officials, political party officials, and 
candidates for political office, in order to obtain or retain business.
8
  It also 
mandates certain accounting requirements for domestic and certain foreign 
 
 6. See infra note 223 and accompanying discussion. 
 7. See FCPA, supra note 2;  see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 6-7 (1977) (noting that 
legislative proposals leading up to the passing of the Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 
1977 were based on an ―extensive [report] . . . issued by the SEC on May 12, 1976 . . . [that] 
revealed the widespread nature of the practice of questionable corporate foreign 
payments.‖); S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 1-2 (1977) (indicating that the Unlawful Corporate 
Payments Act of 1977 was introduced at the request of the SEC, after it presented its 
findings of ―widespread‖ payments that were ―questionable or illegal‖); see also SEC, 
REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (May 12, 
1976) (submitted to the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs), at 2–3, 54–
56 (describing how illegal corporate payments were first uncovered during the 
investigations of the Watergate Special Prosecutor in 1973, leading to the SEC‘s 
involvement, and concluding that ―while the problem of [such] payments is both serious and 
widespread, it can be controlled . . . .‖). 
 8. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -2(g), -3(a), -3(e) (2010). 
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companies with securities publicly-traded in the United States, and requires 
them to report illicit payments.
9
  The FCPA was amended in 1988 to clarify 
some of its provisions in response to criticisms over the original statute.
10
  
It was amended again in 1998 to conform to the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention.
11
 
The FCPA‘s provisions cover certain accounting requirements and 
anti-bribery prohibitions.  The accounting provisions impose recordkeeping 
and internal controls requirements for companies that have a class of 
securities registered with the SEC or that are required to file reports with 
the SEC.
12
  The anti-bribery provisions outlaw the bribery of foreign 
government officials for the purposes of obtaining or retaining business, 
directing business to another person, or securing any improper advantage.
13
 
A. The Accounting Provisions 
The FCPA‘s accounting provisions require that issuers, which are 
companies that have a class of securities registered with the SEC or that are 
required to file reports with the SEC, maintain certain recordkeeping 
standards and internal accounting controls.
14
  The recordkeeping provision 
 
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2010). 
 10. The FCPA was amended as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, Title V, Subtitle A, Part I, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) [hereinafter 
1988 Amendments].  This was signed into law on August 23, 1988. 
 11. The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, signed into law 
on November 10, 1998, amended the FCPA to conform its provisions to the Convention. 
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 
Stat. 3302 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 Amendments]. 
 12. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2010). 
 13. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a) (2010).  The FCPA is both a civil and criminal 
statute, and part of it has been incorporated into the federal securities laws.  As a result, the 
United States Department of Justice (―DOJ‖) is responsible for criminal enforcement of the 
FCPA and for civil enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions against non-issuers, and the 
SEC is responsible for all civil enforcement of the accounting provisions and for civil 
enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions with respect to issuers.  See Mike Koehler, The 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. 
REV. 389, 395-96 (2010) (describing the DOJ‘s responsibility ―for all criminal enforcement‖ 
of the statute and civil enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions against non-issuers subject 
to the FCPA, as well as the SEC‘s  role in regulating issuers). 
 14. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2010).  ―Issuers‖ are those companies that have a class of 
securities registered with the SEC or that are required to file reports with the SEC.  15 
U.S.C. § 78(l)(g), (o)(d) (2010).  This includes foreign companies that list American 
Depository Receipts (―ADRs‖) on a stock exchange.  Section 13(b)(2) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (―Exchange Act‖) requires every issuer to keep accurate books and 
records and establish and maintain a system of internal accounting controls.  15 U.S.C.        
§ 78m(b)(2) (2010).  Rule 13b2-1 provides that ―[n]o person shall directly or indirectly, 
falsify or cause to be falsified, any book, record or account subject to Section 13(b)(2)(A)‖ 
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requires that all issuers ―make and keep books, records, and accounts, 
which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions 
and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.‖
15
  The internal controls 
provision requires that issuers create a system of internal accounting 
controls that provide ―reasonable assurances‖ that transactions are executed 
in ―accordance with management‘s general or specific authorization.‖
16
  
Civil liability will be found with respect to violations of these provisions, 
and criminal liability will also attach under these provisions when a person 
―knowingly‖ circumvents or fails to implement a system of internal 
accounting controls or ―knowingly‖ falsifies the books and records.
17
 
B. The Anti-Bribery Provisions 
The FCPA anti-bribery provisions prohibit the bribing of foreign 
government officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business, 
directing business to other persons, or securing any improper advantage.
18
  
Specifically, the FCPA anti-bribery provisions prohibit: any issuer, 
domestic concern, or any person acting within U.S. territory, or any officer, 
director, employee, agent, or stockholder acting on behalf of any of the 
foregoing from using any means or instrumentality of U.S commerce 
―corruptly‖ in furtherance of an offer, payment, or promise to pay, or 
authorization of the payment of anything of value to any ―foreign official,‖ 
any foreign political party or party official, any candidate for foreign 
political office, any public international organization official, or any other 
person while ―knowing‖ that the payment or promise to pay will be given 
to any of the foregoing for the purpose of influencing any act or decision of 
 
of the Exchange Act.  17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1.  Rule 13b2-2 ―prohibits a director or officer 
of an issuer from making or causing to be made any materially false or misleading statement 
or omission in connection with any audit.‖  17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2. 
 15. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2010).  All transactions by issuers are covered under the 
recordkeeping provision, not just transactions that raise FCPA concerns. 
 16. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (2010).  The provision specifically requires that issuers 
―devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide 
reasonable assurances that:  (i) transactions are executed in accordance with management‘s 
general or specific authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit 
preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting 
principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain 
accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with 
management‘s general or specific authorization; [and] (iv) the recorded accountability for 
assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is 
taken with respect to any differences.‖  Id. 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(4), (5) (2010).  Criminal liability will not flow from a violation 
of the accounting provisions absent this ―knowingly‖ standard.  Id. 
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a) (2010). 
JORDANFINALIZED_TWO (DO NOT DELETE) 9/12/2011 5:10 PM 
886 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 13:4 
 
that person in his or her official capacity, inducing that person to do or omit 
to do any act in violation of his lawful duty, securing any improper 
advantage, or inducing that person to use his influence with a foreign 
government to affect or influence any government act or decision; in order 
to assist such issuer, domestic concern, or person acting within U.S. 
territory, in obtaining or retaining business, or directing business to any 
person.
19
  The definition of ―issuer‖ is the same as that under the FCPA 
accounting provisions.
20
  The definition of ―domestic concern‖ means any 
U.S. citizen, national or resident, as well as any corporation, partnership or 
association, regardless of whether they issue securities, which has its 
principal place of business in the United States or that is incorporated in the 
United States.
21
 
There are two affirmative defenses to the FCPA anti-bribery 
provisions for certain types of payments.  The first affirmative defense is 
when the payment at issue is lawful under the written laws of the relevant 
foreign officials‘ country.
22
  The second affirmative defense allows for 
certain payments made for ―reasonable and bona fide‖ expenditures.
23
  
Reasonable and bona fide expenditures include things such as travel and 
lodging expenses incurred by the foreign official and must be directly 
related to ―the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or 
services,‖ or ―the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign 
government or agency.‖
24
 
III. THE FACILITATION PAYMENTS EXCEPTION 
A. Statutory Language of the Facilitation Payments Exception 
Of relevance to the subject matter of this article is the fact that there is 
 
 19. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a) (2010).  There is both criminal and civil liability 
for violations of the anti-bribery provisions and the provisions have been incorporated into 
the federal securities laws as Section 30A of the Exchange Act.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a).  The 
term ―foreign official‖ means ―any officer or employee of a foreign government or any 
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or 
any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government or 
department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public international 
organization.‖  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), -2(h)(2)(A), -3(f)(2)(A) (2010). 
 20. 15 U.S.C. § 78(l)(g) (2010); see also supra note 14 and accompanying discussion. 
 21. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1) (2010).  The FCPA‘s anti-bribery provisions do not 
generally apply to foreign corporations unless some action in furtherance of the bribe occurs 
within the territory of the United States.  Dooley v. United Tech. Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428, 
439 (D.D.C. 1992). 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(1), -2(c)(1), -3(c)(1) (2010). 
 23. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(2), -2(c)(2), -3(c)(2) (2010). 
 24. Id. 
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an exception to the FCPA anti-bribery provisions that permits so-called 
―facilitation‖ or ―grease‖ payments to foreign officials for the purposes of 
expediting or securing the performance of a ―routine governmental 
action.‖
25
  The term ―routine governmental action‖ means any action that is 
ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official, such as obtaining 
permits, processing visas, and lining up basic services.
26
  More specifically, 
the statute itself defines ―routine governmental action‖ as:  
[A]n action which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a 
foreign official in:  
(i)  obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents 
to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country; 
(ii)  processing governmental papers, such as visas and work 
orders; 
(iii) providing police protection, mail pick-up and delivery, 
or scheduling inspections associated with contract 
performance or inspections related to transit of goods 
across the country; 
(iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, 
loading and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable 
products or commodities from deterioration; or 
(v)  actions of a similar nature.
27
 
Payments made to expedite any of the basic services listed above or 
―of a similar nature,‖ are not considered violative payments prohibited by 
the FCPA.
28
  However, what constitutes ―actions of a similar nature‖ 
beyond the specific definition of the exception itself is uncertain.  What is 
certain is that such actions cannot be related to the awarding of new 
business or continued business.
29
  The FCPA specifically provides that: 
The term routine governmental action does not include any 
decision by a foreign official whether, or on what terms, to award 
new business to or to continue business with a particular party, or 
any action taken by a foreign official involved in the decision-
making process to encourage a decision to award new business to 
or to continue business with a particular party.
30
 
 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b), -2(b), -3(b) (2010). 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(A), -2(h)(4)(A), -3(f)(4)(A) (2010). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(B), -2(h)(4)(B), -3(f)(4)(B) (2010). 
 30. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(3)(B), -2(h)(4)(B), -3(f)(4)(B) (2010) (internal quotations 
omitted).  The DOJ has stated that ―a determination of whether or not a payment is for 
‗facilitation‘ or is made with corrupt intent hinges upon whether the payment is made to 
obtain or retain business and whether it is routine in nature (such as connecting a phone) or 
discretionary (such as assessing a customs duty).‖  OECD Working Group on Bribery, 
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There are several important things to note about the facilitation 
payments exception and the exception‘s practical application under both 
domestic and foreign law.  First, the facilitation payments exception applies 
only to the FCPA‘s anti-bribery provisions and not to the accounting 
provisions.
31
  Therefore, issuers that make facilitation payments, but do not 
properly record such payments in their books and records, will still be 
liable under the FCPA‘s accounting provisions.
32
 
Second, almost every country in the world, including the United 
States, outlaws facilitation payments under their respective domestic 
bribery laws.
33
  This poses a unique problem since corporations making 
facilitation payments may be very hesitant to properly record such 
payments, because doing so would be essentially tantamount to confessing 
to bribes in violation of a relevant foreign jurisdiction‘s domestic bribery 
law.  The making of facilitation payments thus creates a strong inducement 
for companies to conceal or falsify the true purpose of such payments in 
violation of the FCPA‘s accounting provisions.  This leaves issuers who 
make facilitation payments with a Catch-22 every time that they do so.  On 
the one hand, the issuers could properly record the payments in their books 
and records and run the risk of criminal liability under a relevant foreign 
jurisdiction‘s domestic bribery law.  On the other, they could conceal or 
falsely record the payments in their books and records and run the risk of 
violating the FCPA‘s accounting provisions.  Either way, it is a lose-lose 
situation. 
Another important aspect of the facilitation payments exception is that 
 
Response of the United States, Questions Concerning Phase 3, at 25 (May 3, 2010), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/response3.pdf.  If a payment is 
made ―to secure something to which the payor is entitled, as opposed to an act that is 
discretionary, it is more likely to lack the necessary mens rea to be a violation‖ of the 
FCPA.  Id. 
 31. Lucinda A. Low, Owen Bonheimer & Negar Katirai, Enforcement of the FCPA in 
the United States: Trends and the Effects of International Standards, 1665 PLI/CORP 711, 
725 (2008). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Thomas Fox, End of Grease Payments Coming, CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS, 
Apr. 5, 2010, at 3 (reiterating that facilitation payments are illegal in all countries in which 
they occur); Melissa Aguilar, New OECD Stance on Facilitation Payments, COMPLIANCE 
WEEK, Dec. 18, 2009 (noting that facilitation payments ―are illegal under local law in all of 
the countries in which they‘re paid‖); TRACE, TRACE FACILITATION PAYMENTS 
BENCHMARKING SURVEY 2  (2009) [hereinafter TRACE SURVEY] (describing how TRACE 
represents itself to be a non-profit, non-voting membership association ―that pools resources 
to provide practical and cost-effective anti-bribery compliance for multinational 
companies‖); see also www.traceinternational.org/about (indicating that TRACE is funded 
by membership fees from ―member companies‖ (multinational corporations) and ―member 
intermediaries‖ (commercial intermediaries used by multinational corporations such as 
agents, sales representatives, consultants or dealers)). 
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it is somewhat unique to the United States and the FCPA, and is not an 
exception under most foreign anti-bribery laws.
34
  Only five countries in the 
world, including the United States, provide an exception for facilitation 
payments under their relevant foreign anti-bribery laws.
35
  Therefore, 
domestic companies that make and properly record facilitation payments in 
compliance with the FCPA can still find themselves liable for such 
payments under some other country‘s foreign anti-bribery law. 
B. History Behind the Facilitation Payments Exception 
To understand the purpose of the facilitation payments exception and 
why it was created when it was, one needs to look at the legislative history 
behind the exception and the era in which it was created.  In today‘s global 
anti-bribery environment, where few countries allow for facilitation 
payments, it is hard to understand why the United States created the 
exception in the first place.  However, when one looks back at the 
international business climate during the time of the drafting of the FCPA, 
it is easy to understand why the exception was included and desired as part 
of the original statute. 
1. Congress Creates the Facilitation Payments Exception in the 
Original FCPA 
The original version of the FCPA enacted in 1977 provided an 
exception for facilitation payments, but it was very different from the 
exception as it exists today.
36
  At the time, the exception existed through a 
combination of statutory language and legislative history indicating 
Congress‘s intent to specifically carve out an exception for so-called 
―grease‖ payments through the definition of a ―foreign official.‖
37
 
a. The Facilitation Payments Exception‟s Original Existence 
under the Definition of a “Foreign Official” 
In the original version of the FCPA, the facilitation payments 
exception existed through the definition of a ―foreign official.‖
38
  The 
 
 34. Low, Bonheimer & Katirai, supra note 31, at 725. 
 35. TRACE SURVEY, supra note 33, at 2. 
 36. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977). 
 37. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977); see also Weinograd, supra note 2, at 517 
(explaining that Congress created a legislative exception, distinguishing facilitating 
payments from bribes). 
 38. MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30079, FOREIGN CORRUPT 
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definition of a ―foreign official‖ at the time excluded those employees of a 
foreign government whose ―duties‖ were essentially ―ministerial or 
clerical.‖
39
  Thus, payments made to an official whose duties were 
―ministerial or clerical‖ would not be considered improper payments made 
to a ―foreign official,‖ as prohibited by the FCPA.
40
 
The legislative history behind the drafting of the FCPA reveals that 
Congress intended to carve out an exception for facilitation payments 
through the definition of a ―foreign official.‖
41
  The House of 
Representatives‘ Report into the legislation creating the FCPA (―House 
Report‖) stated that the ―bill‘s coverage‖ did ―not extend to so-called 
grease or facilitating payments.‖
42
  To this end, the House Report stated 
that the bill‘s language was ―deliberately‖ drafted in a way, through the 
definition of a ―foreign official,‖ so as to ―differentiate‖ between payments 
prohibited by the FCPA and ―grease payments‖ allowed under the statute.
43
  
The Senate Report on the original FCPA also indicated the same.
44
  The 
Senate Report stated that the FCPA was supposed to cover ―payments 
made to foreign officials for the purposes of obtaining business‖ and not to 
―cover so-called ‗grease payments.‘‖
45
 
 
PRACTICES ACT 2 (1999). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.; see also James R. Hines, Jr., Forbidden Payment: Foreign Bribery and 
American Business After 1977 5 (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5266, 
1995) (noting the ministerial or clerical exception to the FCPA‘s grease payment policy). 
 41. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977). 
 42. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977). 
 43. Id.  The House Report stated that by using the word ―corruptly‖ in the FCPA, 
Congress had intended to ―distinguish between payments which cause an official to exercise 
other than his free will in acting or deciding or influencing an act or decision and those 
payments which merely move a particular matter toward an eventual act or decision or 
which do not involve any discretionary action.‖  Id. at 8.  The House Report noted that 
through the definition of ―foreign official‖ that Congress ―emphasize[d] this crucial 
distinction‖ by excluding from the definition of a ―foreign official‖ those government 
employees whose duties were of a ―ministerial or clerical‖ nature.  Id.  The House Report 
stated that ―[f]or example, a gratuity paid to a customs official to speed the processing of a 
customs document would not be reached by the bill‖ and that it would also not reach 
―payments made to secure permits, licenses, or the expeditious performance of similar 
duties of an essentially ministerial or clerical nature which must of necessity by performed 
in any event.‖  Id. 
 44. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977). 
 45. Id.  The Senate Report stated in this respect that the FCPA did not ―cover so-called 
‗grease payments‘ such as payments for expediting shipments through customs or placing a 
transatlantic telephone call, securing required permits, or obtaining adequate police 
protection, transactions which may involve even the proper performance of duties.‖  Id. 
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b. Congress‟s Acquiescence Towards “Reprehensible” 
Facilitation Payments 
The legislative history behind the enactment of the FCPA provides an 
interesting glimpse into a Congress that created the exception for 
facilitation payments, despite its view that facilitation payments were 
―reprehensible.‖
46
  Congress was concerned during the time of the drafting 
of the FCPA in the late seventies that facilitation payments appeared to be a 
part of doing business internationally and that unilaterally prohibiting 
domestic companies from making them, on top of the restrictions already 
imposed by the FCPA, would place them at a competitive disadvantage in 
the global marketplace.
47
  This concern by Congress is best revealed in the 
following passage from a House Report: 
While payments made to assure or to speed the proper 
performance of a foreign official‘s duties may be reprehensible 
in the United States, the [Congress] recognizes that they are not 
necessarily so viewed elsewhere in the world and that it is not 
feasible for the United States to attempt unilaterally to eradicate 
all such payments.
48
 
This passage clearly indicates Congress‘s disdain for facilitation 
payments during the drafting of the FCPA, while also revealing its 
recognition that ―unilaterally‖ prohibiting them would have harmed 
domestic companies and their ability to compete in the international 
marketplace.
49
  In this respect, Congress appeared to acquiesce to the 
necessary evil of allowing for facilitation payments, given the burden 
already imposed on domestic companies as a result of the FCPA.
50
 
2. The 1988 Amendments Call on the United States Government to 
Pursue an International Anti-Bribery Agreement through the 
OECD 
The FCPA was the subject of much criticism after the passage of the 
new statute.
51
  Many in the business community complained that the FCPA 
had put domestic companies at a disadvantage to their foreign competitors, 
since domestic companies could no longer pay the bribes often necessary to 
 
 46. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. (emphasis by this author).  The House Report then stated ―[a]s a result, the 
[Congress] has not attempted to reach such payments.‖  Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Weinograd, supra note 2, at 517. 
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land lucrative government contracts that their foreign counterparts could.
52
  
Some also argued that this disadvantage resulted in a downturn in 
profitability for many domestic companies.
53
  This led some critics to call 
for an international agreement with the world‘s industrialized countries that 
would impose on foreign companies the same kind of prohibitions that 
domestic companies were facing under the FCPA.
54
  The idea was that if 
foreign companies were under the same kind of anti-bribery laws as 
domestic companies were, the playing field would be more level and 
foreign competitors would no longer have an unfair advantage.
55
 
Outside of the adverse competitive effects of the FCPA, critics also 
complained that the language within the FCPA was vague, especially with 
respect to the facilitation payments exception.
56
  These critics argued that 
the FCPA did not specifically spell out, by their purpose, what permissible 
grease payments were, as legislative history had suggested, but instead 
focused on the recipient‘s position and whether the recipient‘s duties were 
―ministerial or clerical.‖
57
  These critics argued that the vagueness in the 
exception, along with other parts of the FCPA, had created a chilling effect 
in the export trade market for many domestic companies, since many 
companies had stopped dealing in the market altogether due to the 
uncertainties of complying with the FCPA.
58
  These critics contended that 
the FCPA needed more specific guidelines, including better language in the 
facilitation payments exception.
59
 
a. Clarification of the Facilitation Payments Exception 
As a result of the criticisms, for several years Congress considered 
amending the FCPA.
60
  Congress recognized that it had intended to create 
an exception for facilitation payments, but that the practical application of 
the exception, as spelled out within the statute, was unworkable.
61
  After 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. See Alexandros Zervos, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Repealing 
the Exemption for “Routine Government Action” Payments, 25 PENN ST. INT‘L L. REV. 251, 
256 (2006) (suggesting that critics believed the FCPA posed a major competitive burden to 
American businesses, placing them at a disadvantage to corrupt foreign competitors). 
 54. SEITZINGER, supra note 38, at 3. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Weinograd, supra note 2, at 517. 
 57. Id. at 518. 
 58. SEITZINGER, supra note 38, at 3.  Some of the critics of the FCPA, as originally 
enacted, have estimated that its provisions cost as much as one billion dollars annually in 
eliminated export trade.  Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, pt. 2, at 77 (1987) (―However, there has been some 
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many hearings and debates spanning three different Congresses, the FCPA 
was finally amended in 1988 to clarify several provisions within the statute, 
including the facilitation payments exception.
62
 
Through the 1988 Amendments, Congress codified the exception into 
its present day form by allowing domestic corporations to make payments 
for the purposes of expediting a ―routine governmental action.‖
63
  In doing 
so, the amendments changed the exception‘s focus from the status of a 
payment recipient and shifted it to the purpose of the payment itself.
64
 
b. A Call to Pursue an International Anti-Bribery Agreement 
through the OECD 
It is important to note that in the 1988 Amendments, Congress 
recognized the criticisms that domestic companies were at a disadvantage 
in comparison to foreign companies as a result of the FCPA, and called on 
the United States government to pursue an international agreement to 
prohibit foreign bribery.
65
  The 1988 Amendments specifically called on 
the President of the United States to pursue the international agreement 
through the OECD.
66
  Specifically, the 1988 Amendments stated: 
Negotiations.  It is the sense of the Congress that the President 
should pursue the negotiation of an international agreement, 
among the members of the [O]rganization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development, to govern persons from those 
countries concerning acts prohibited with respect to issuers and 
 
criticism that the current statutory language does not clearly reflect Congressional intent and 
the boundaries of prohibited conduct.‖); see also Weinograd, supra note 2, at 518 (citing S. 
REP. NO. 100-85, at 53 (1987)) (―Notwithstanding the intent to exempt facilitating payments 
from the FCPA‘s bribery prohibition, the method chosen by Congress in 1977 to accomplish 
this has been difficult to apply in practice.‖). 
 62. 1988 Amendments, supra note 10; SEITZINGER, supra note 38, at 3; Hines, supra 
note 40, at 4. 
 63. Weinograd, supra note 2, at 518; 1988 Amendments, supra note 10. 
 64. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b), -1(f)(3)(A), -2(b), -2(h)(4)(A), -3(b), -3(f)(4)(A) (2010); 
1988 Amendments, supra note 10. 
 65. 1988 Amendments, supra note 10; Omnibus Trade and Competiveness Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003(d), 102 Stat. 1107, 1424 (1988). 
 66. 1988 Amendments, supra note 10.  The House of Representatives‘ bill related to the 
1988 Amendments originally stated that the President should pursue the negotiation of an 
international agreement ―among the largest possible number of countries‖ to ―govern acts‖ 
prohibited by the FCPA.  H.R. CONFERENCE REP. NO. 100-576, at 924 (1988).  The Senate 
bill contained no such provision.  1988 Amendments, supra note 10, at 1424.  After a 
conference agreement on the legislation, the Senate ended up conceding to the House, with 
an amendment that an international agreement be pursued with the member countries of the 
OECD.  Id. 
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domestic concerns by the amendments made by this section.
67
 
Thus, the 1988 Amendments created a mandate for the United States 
to push other countries to enact similar foreign anti-bribery laws similar to 
those of the FCPA, so that the United States would no longer be alone in 
fighting foreign bribery throughout the world.
68
  Interestingly, the 1988 
Amendments chose the OECD as the avenue through which to pursue this 
goal.
69
 
IV. THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 
With the congressional direction in the 1998 Amendments to go 
through the OECD in encouraging other countries to enter into an 
international anti-bribery agreement, the United States got to work.
70
  In 
1989, the United States began pushing OECD member countries to enact 
an international agreement with prohibitions similar to that of the FCPA.
71
  
These efforts led to the OECD‘s adoption of a non-binding package of 
recommendations in 1994 concerning foreign bribery which, among other 
things, recommended that member countries ―take effective measures to 
deter, prevent and combat the bribery of foreign public officials in 
connection with international business transactions.‖
72
  A few years later, in 
1997, the OECD evaluated the measures implemented by member 
countries in following the recommendations and at that time the United 
States delegation to the OECD pushed harder for an international anti-
bribery agreement.
73
 
A. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention‟s Prohibitions 
Ultimately, the United States‘ efforts led to the OECD‘s adoption of 
 
 67. 1988 Amendments, supra note 10; Omnibus Trade and Competiveness Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003(d), 102 Stat. 1107, 1424 (1988).  The passage then goes on to 
state that ―[s]uch international agreement should include a process by which problems and 
conflicts associated with such acts could be resolved.‖  1988 Amendments, supra note 10. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 2 (1998). 
 71. H. REP. NO. 105-802, at 13 (1998); Rebecca Koch, The Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act: It‟s Time to Cut Back the Grease and Add some Guidance, 28 B.C. INT‘L & COMP. L. 
REV. 379, 387 (2005). 
 72. OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Bribery in International Business 
Transactions, at 3 (adopted on May 27, 1994), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/52/1952622.pdf. 
 73. Koch, supra note 71, at 387. 
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the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in 1997.
74
  The Convention is an 
international agreement that requires signatory countries to enact laws in 
conformity with its provisions designed to criminalize the bribery of 
foreign officials.
75
  On December 17, 1997, thirty countries signed the 
Convention, and on February 15, 1999, the Convention officially entered 
into force.
76
  Today, the Convention has been signed and ratified by thirty-
eight countries, consisting of the leading business and trading nations in the 
world.
77
 
The Preamble to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention states that 
―bribery is a widespread phenomenon in international business 
transactions‖ which ―raises serious moral and political concerns, 
undermines good governance and economic development, and distorts 
competitive conditions.‖
78
  The Preamble then declares that ―all countries 
share a responsibility‖ in combating ―bribery in international business 
transactions.‖
79
 
The core anti-bribery provisions in the Convention are contained in 
Article 1.
80
  Specifically, Article 1 of the Convention, entitled ―The Offence 
 
 74. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3. 
 75. Id. During the twenty-year time frame from the United States‘ enactment of the 
FCPA to the time of the adoption of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, the United States 
was practically alone in ―criminalizing foreign bribery.‖  H. REP. NO. 105-802, at 11 (1998).  
In 1998 the United States amended the FCPA to confirm its provisions to the Convention 
through the 1998 Amendments.  1998 Amendments, supra note 11.  In signing the 1998 
Amendments, President Bill Clinton stated that ―[s]ince the enactment in 1977 of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. business have faced criminal penalties if they engaged 
in business-related bribery of foreign public officials‖ while their ―foreign competitors . . . 
did not have similar restrictions and could engage in their corrupt activity without fear of 
penalty.‖  Statement by President William J. Clinton, Nov. 10, 1998.  He stated that ―as a 
result, U.S. companies have had to compete on an uneven playing field, resulting in losses 
of international contracts estimated at $30 billion per year.‖  Id. 
 76. H. REP. NO. 105-802, at 13 (1998); Press Release, OECD, OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention: Entry into Force of the Convention, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3343,en_2649_34859_2057484_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 77. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention has been ratified by all thirty-three OECD 
member countries.  OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Public Transactions, Ratification Status as of March 2009, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/13/40272933.pdf.  Five countries that are not members of 
the OECD have also agreed to sign the document.  These countries include Argentina, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Estonia, and South Africa.  Id.  Noteworthy countries that have yet to sign 
the Convention are China, India, Indonesia, Thailand, and Russia.  Id.  However efforts have 
been undertaken by the OECD to encourage these nations to join the Convention.  OECD, 
OECD Working Group on Bribery Annual Report 2009, at 11, (2009) [hereinafter OCED 
2009 Report], available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/46/0,3746,en_2649_34857_44271086_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 78. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3, at Preamble. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at art. 1. 
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of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials,‖ requires that: 
Each [p]arty shall take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish that it is a criminal offence under its law for any person 
intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or 
other advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a 
foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in 
order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the 
performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain 
business or other improper advantage in the conduct of 
international business.
81
 
Article 1 also states that ―[e]ach [p]arty shall take any measures 
necessary to establish that complicity in, including incitement, aiding and 
abetting, or authorisation of an act of bribery of a foreign public official 
shall be a criminal offence.‖
82
  Thus, Article 1 obligates signatory countries 
to enact laws, in conformity with the prohibitions contained in the 
Convention, designed to specifically prohibit and criminalize the bribery of 
foreign public officials.
83
 
B. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention‟s Permissibility of “Small” 
Facilitation Payments 
The articles within the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention are silent as to 
the issue of facilitation payments.
84
  Nevertheless, Commentary 9 to the 
Convention, relevant to the application and interpretation of Article 1, 
provides an exception for ―small‖ facilitation payments.
85
  Specifically, the 
first sentence of Commentary 9 provides that: 
[S]mall ―facilitation‖ payments do not constitute payments made 
―to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage‖ within 
 
 81. Id.  It is worth noting that the 1998 Amendments had to add the ―improper 
advantage‖ language to the FCPA to conform it to the Convention.  1998 Amendments, 
supra note 11. 
 82. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1.  Article 1 furthermore 
provides that ―[a]ttempt and conspiracy to bribe a foreign public official shall be criminal 
offences to the same extent as attempt and conspiracy to bribe a public official of that 
Party.‖  Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.  This is likely because the FCPA‘s exception for facilitation payments attracted 
international criticism of the exception during the implementation of the Convention.  Koch, 
supra note 71, at 393. 
 85. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3, at Commentary 9.  Commentaries to 
the Convention were adopted by the Negotiating Conference on November 21, 1997.  Id. 
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the meaning of paragraph 1 [of Article 1] and, accordingly, are 
also not an offence.
86
 
The Convention therefore allows an exception for ―small‖ facilitation 
payments from the relevant anti-bribery prohibitions.
87
  Despite allowing 
for the exception, the rest of Commentary 9 then goes on to criticize 
facilitation payments.
88
  Calling facilitation payments a ―corrosive 
phenomenon,‖ the commentary stresses the need to address such payments 
through good corporate governance programs.
89
  The commentary then 
ironically stops short of calling for the criminalization of such payments.
90
  
In this respect, the remainder of Commentary 9 provides: 
Such payments, which, in some countries, are made to induce 
public officials to perform their functions, such as issuing 
licenses or permits, are generally illegal in the foreign country 
concerned.  Other countries can and should address this corrosive 
phenomenon by such means as support for programmes of good 
governance.  However, criminalisation by other countries does 
not seem a practical or effective complementary action.
91
 
It is important to note several things regarding Commentary 9.  First, 
from the beginning the OECD did not have a favorable view of facilitation 
payments when it originally drafted the Convention, calling them a 
―corrosive phenomenon.‖
92
  Nevertheless, the OECD opted to tackle the 
problem through calling on signatory countries to support good governance 
programs, rather than necessarily criminalizing the payments themselves.
93
  
This action, in a way, mirrored the United States and its behavior when it 
enacted the FCPA, where Congress viewed facilitation payments as 
―reprehensible,‖ yet provided an exception for these payments anyway.
94
 
In addition, it is worth observing that the OECD specifically used the 
word ―small‖ when referring to facilitation payments under the relevant 
commentary.
95
  While arguably all facilitation payments could be 
considered ―small‖ in nature, the term itself could be open to interpretation, 
and in fact later did become a repetitive issue between the OECD and the 
United States concerning the scope of the FCPA‘s facilitation payments 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977) (calling facilitation payments reprehensible 
in the United States); see also supra notes 46 through 50 and accompanying discussion. 
 95. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3, at Commentary 9. 
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exception.
96
 
It is also worth noting that the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is the 
only international agreement to recognize facilitation payments, to date.
97
  
Amazingly, all of the other major international treaties governing foreign 
bribery have been completely silent on the issue of facilitation payments.
98
  
Presumably, this could mean that these other treaties do not provide for an 
exception for facilitation payments. 
V. INTERNATIONAL DISDAIN FOR FACILITATION PAYMENTS IN THE FIRST 
DECADE OF THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 
The first decade of the Convention saw ever-growing scrutiny and 
criticism of facilitation payments.  The United States had finally gotten 
what it wanted—an international network of countries banning the bribery 
of foreign public officials—yet the avenue of doing so, through the 
Convention, resulted in uninvited criticism of the facilitation payments 
exception. 
A. Building OECD Criticism of the Facilitation Payments Exception 
As noted before, signatories to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
were required to take measures to enact domestic laws prohibiting foreign 
bribery, to comply with the relevant provisions of the Convention.
99
  And 
while all of the signatory countries did so, only five had foreign anti-
bribery laws allowing for facilitation payments, with these countries being 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States.
100
  
 
 96. See infra notes 112 and 202 and accompanying discussion (describing the problem 
of using the word ―small‖ when discussing facilitation payments). 
 97. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3, at Commentary 9. 
 98. The Organization of American States Inter-American Convention Against 
Corruption, the first multilateral anti-corruption treaty in the world when it was adopted in 
1996, makes no reference to facilitation payments.  Inter-American Convention Against 
Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724.  Likewise, two major international anti-bribery 
treaties adopted after the Convention are also silent with respect to facilitation payments.  
The United Nations Convention against Corruption, adopted in 2003, says nothing about 
facilitation payments.  United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. 
Doc. A/58/422 (Oct. 31, 2003).  Additionally, the African Union Convention on Preventing 
and Combating Corruption, also adopted in 2003, is silent on the issue of facilitation 
payments.  African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 11, 
2003, 43 I.L.M. 5 (the AU Corruption Convention entered into force on Aug. 5, 2006).  The 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention therefore appears to be the only global or multilateral 
treaty that addresses and allows for an exception for facilitation payments within its 
provisions.  OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3, at Commentary 9. 
 99. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3, at art. 1. 
 100. TRACE SURVEY, supra note 33, at 2; Claudius O. Sokenu, FCPA News and Insights, 
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Some might consider the small number of countries allowing for 
facilitation payments odd, given that the Convention specifically allowed 
for an exception.
101
  However, the limited number may not be so odd when 
taking into account that almost every domestic bribery law in the world 
outlaws the making of facilitation payments.
102
 
Following the passage of the Convention, the OECD began to monitor 
how countries implemented and enforced the relevant domestic legislations 
implementing the Convention‘s prohibitions.  This monitoring was done by 
the OECD Working Group on Bribery (―OECD Working Group‖ or 
―Working Group‖) and involved several different phases.
103
  Phase 1 of the 
monitoring involved an evaluation of whether signatory countries had 
adequately implemented the Convention under their own domestic 
legislations.
104
  Phase 2 of the review then assessed whether signatory 
 
An Update on Recent Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Global Anti-Corruption 
Enforcement, Litigation, and Compliance Developments, 1814 PLI/CORP 641, 652 (2010); 
Fox, supra note 33, at 3. 
 101. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3, at Commentary 9.  While the United 
States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea explicitly provided for the 
facilitation payment exception in their own laws, the countries of Denmark, Slovakia, 
Sweden, Norway and Switzerland recognized Commentary 9 to the Convention by 
expressing, through interpretations of their own relevant foreign anti-bribery laws or 
otherwise, that small facilitation payments may not fall within the prohibitions of their 
relevant foreign anti-bribery laws.  Zervos, supra note 53, at 252 n. 8. 
 102. See, e.g., TRACE SURVEY, supra note 33, at 2 (explaining that only a few 
jurisdictions allow grease payments). 
 103. OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Country Monitoring of the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3343,en_2649_34859_35692940_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
This monitoring was provided for under Article 12 of the Convention.  OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, supra note 3, at art. 12.  The Working Group is made up of representatives 
from the signatory countries that are parties to the Convention, and the group meets four 
times a year in Paris.  OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, OECD 
Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/5/0,3343,en_2649_34859_35430021_1_1_1_1,00.html.  
The Working Group publishes its country monitoring reports online through the OECD 
website.  For an outline of issues concerning country monitoring as agreed to by the 
Working Group on Bribery, see the OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, 
Country Monitoring Principles for the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, [hereinafter 
Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention], available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/45/0,3343,en_2649_34859_44976877_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 104. Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 103.  This 
phase entailed looking at the written legislative text implementing the Convention and the 
relevant elements of the signatory countries‘ legal systems in evaluating and determining 
whether the Convention had been adequately implemented within the signatory countries‘ 
domestic legal frameworks.  OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Phase 
1 Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,3343,en_2649_34859_2022613_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
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countries had applied the implementing legislations effectively.
105
 
1. OECD Phase 1 Report of the United States 
In April 1999, the OECD published its Phase 1 Report on the United 
States‘ implementation of the Convention.
106
  In the Phase 1 Report, the 
OECD Working Group expressed concern over the FCPA‘s definition of 
―routine governmental action,‖ in that the definition contained a list of 
specific payments that could be excepted from the FCPA‘s prohibitions.
107
  
The Working Group felt that the list of specific payments under the 
definition was ―not sufficiently qualified, for example by reference to the 
size of the payment, and the discretionary nature and the legality of the 
reciprocal act.‖
108
  In this regard, the Working Group remarked that the 
definition and the exception were ―potentially subject to misuse.‖
109
 
2. OECD Phase 2 Report of the United States 
A little over three years later, in October 2002, the OECD published 
its Phase 2 Report on the United States‘ application of the Convention.
110
  
In the Phase 2 Report, the OECD Working Group again criticized the 
facilitation payments exception.
111
  This time, the Working Group criticized 
the wording of the exception for not being limited to ―small‖ facilitation 
 
 105. Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 103.  This 
phase looked into the enforcement structures designed to enforce the relevant laws 
implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention ―and to assess their application in 
practice.‖  OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Phase 2 Country 
Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/27/0,3343,en_2649_34859_2022939_1_1_1_1,00.html.  In 
2009, the Working Group adopted a new Phase 3 round of monitoring which involved, 
among other things, looking at the signatory countries‘ enforcement of the Convention and 
how these countries had implemented recommendations by the Working Group made in the 
first two phases of monitoring.  See infra notes 183-86 and accompanying discussion.  The 
Phase 3 monitoring process also looked into how countries were responding and 
implementing the OECD Recommendation.  Id. 
 106. OECD, United States, Review of Implementation of the Convention and 1997 
Recommendation, (Apr. 1999) [hereinafter Phase 1 Report], available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/50/2390377.pdf. 
 107. Id. at 22. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. OECD, United States: Phase 2, Report on Application of the Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and 
the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, 
(Oct. 2002) [hereinafter Phase 2 Report]. 
 111. Id. at 34. 
JORDANFINALIZED_TWO (DO NOT DELETE) 9/12/2011 5:10 PM 
2011] THE OECD’S CALL 901 
 
payments, as provided for in the Convention.
112
  The Working Group also 
criticized the United States for having an exception for facilitation 
payments under the FCPA when there was no exception under its own 
domestic bribery statute.
113
  The Working Group then stated that ―[t]o the 
extent‖ that the exception was ―open to interpretation,‖ it ―may be regarded 
as an area of risk and . . . misuse,‖ as previously noted in the Phase 1 
Report.
114
 
The Working Group also criticized the United States for what it 
perceived to be an ―absence of any clear, published guidance‖ with respect 
to the exception.
115
  The Working Group was concerned that there was not 
a ―per se limit on the size of the payment‖ in the exception and that the 
exception instead focused exclusively on the ―purpose‖ of the payment.
116
  
The Working Group then suggested ―that there may be a case for guidance 
to be issued by the U.S. Department of Justice (―DOJ‖)‖ in explaining how 
it interpreted the exception.  The Working Group formally recommended, 
among other things, that the United States ―[c]onsider developing‖ such 
―specific guidance.‖
117
 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 201). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id.  In this regard the Working Group noted that ―[n]o court has interpreted the 
application of this exception and there are no settled cases to assist in delineating the 
boundary between acceptable and unacceptable payments.‖  Id.  The Working Group also 
stated that there were ―also no relevant DOJ Opinions.‖  Id.  The report stated that ―[i]f a 
company asks the DOJ for informal advice or reports a payment, the lead examiners were 
told that the DOJ will sometimes determine straight away, on the basis of judgment and 
experience, whether it falls within the exception and if so, take no further action.‖  Id.  The 
Working Group felt that this operated ―as a sort of informal, undocumented ‗de minimis‘ 
rule.‖  Id. 
 117. Id. at 34, 38.  The Working Group stated that ―[a]lternatively consideration should 
be given to amending the wording‖ of the FCPA ―to clarify, for the benefit of all, that only 
minor payments are allowable.‖  Id. at 34.   On February 20, 2005, the United States 
addressed the OECD Working Group‘s recommendations contained in the Phase 2 Report.  
OECD, United States: Phase 2, Follow-Up Report on the Implementation of the Phase 2 
Recommendations on the Application of the Convention and the 1997 Recommendation on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, at 5-
23 (June 1, 2005) [hereinafter Phase 2 Follow-up Report].  In response to the Working 
Group‘s recommendation that the United States provide specific guidance on the facilitation 
payments exception, the United States responded that ―[w]e presently believe that the 
language of the FCPA, including its definition of ‗facilitating or expediting payments,‘ is 
sufficient guidance.‖   Id. at 9.  The United States also noted that the DOJ had an opinion 
procedure in place that ―permits companies to request an opinion on whether specific, non-
hypothetical, prospective conduct would violate the FCPA,‖ including conduct related to 
facilitation payments, and stated that the DOJ ―does not presently intend to offer any 
additional specific guidance outside of the Opinion Procedures.‖  Id.  The Working Group in 
turn responded in a follow-up report concerning its Phase 2 recommendations on June 1, 
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B. International Non-Governmental Organizations calling for an End to 
Facilitation Payments 
While the OECD accepted, yet criticized, the use of facilitation 
payments during the first decade of the Convention, certain other 
international non-governmental organizations viewed these payments as 
bribes and refused to accept them as permissible under any kind of law. 
1. Transparency International 
Transparency International has been the most active and vocal 
international non-governmental organization on the issue of foreign bribery 
since the enactment of the Convention.  It has also been a leading 
international organization in the fight against corruption and is primarily 
known for its ―Corruptions Perception Index,‖ which rates countries based 
on how corrupt people perceive them to be.
118
 
 
2005, that it still held ―the view that, in the continuous absence of authoritative guidance, 
the existing exception for facilitation payments . . . may lead to uncertainty into the 
interpretation of the FCPA.‖  Id. at 4.  In this regard, the Phase 2 Follow Report concluded, 
among other things, that the Working Group‘s recommendation of specific guidance in 
relation to the facilitation payments exception still required ―further consideration from the 
United States.‖  Id.  On May 22, 2006, the OECD released its Mid-Term Study of Phase 2 
Reports, which contained an analysis on the application of the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention by all of the signatory countries.  OECD, Mid-Term Study of Phase 2 Reports, 
Application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating Bribery 
in International Business Transactions, (May 22, 2006) [hereinafter Mid-Term Study].  In 
the Mid-Term Study the Working Group noted that it had recommended that the ―United 
States consider developing guidance in relation to the facilitation payments exception‖ and 
that the United States had responded that it felt that the FCPA‘s language was ―sufficient 
guidance‖ in itself.  Id. at 21.  Perhaps foreshadowing a wind of change by the OECD on the 
issue of facilitation payments, the Working Group then stated that it might ―undertake a 
mid- to long-term analysis about whether the exception for ‗small facilitation payments‘ in 
Commentary 9‖ was ―too vague to implement in practice.‖  Id. at 147. 
 118. See About Us, TRANSPARENCY INT‘L, (Mar. 16, 2011), 
http://www.transparency.org/about_us.  Transparency International‘s ―mission‖ is a ―world 
free of corruption.‖  Id.  Transparency International was founded in 1993 and has a network 
of more than ninety chapters throughout the world and an official international ―secretariat‖ 
based in Berlin, Germany.  See TRANSPARENCY INT‘L, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2009: 
CORRUPTION AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR, at i (2009), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr_2009. Transparency International‘s 
Corruption Perceptions Index ranks 178 countries throughout the world.  TRANSPARENCY 
INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2010, at 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010.  The 2010 
Corruption Perceptions Index listed Denmark, New Zealand, Singapore, Finland, and 
Sweden as the five least corrupt countries in the world.  Id.  On the opposite side of the 
spectrum, the index listed Somalia, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan as the five most 
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Transparency International was a strong opponent of facilitation 
payments during the first decade of the Convention, and during that time 
took several steps to condemn and call for the elimination of facilitation 
payments.
119
  In 2003, Transparency International published its Business 
Principles for Countering Bribery, designed to help companies develop and 
implement effective compliance programs geared towards the prevention of 
bribery.
120
  The Business Principles, which stated that companies should 
prohibit bribery ―in any form,‖ and implement a compliance program 
designed to do so, specifically recommended that companies develop a 
compliance program that would, among other things, prohibit the use of 
facilitation payments.
121
 
A year later in a ―Guidance Document‖ to the Business Principles, 
Transparency International again spoke out against facilitation payments 
and called on all companies to ―eliminate facilitation payments‖ in all 
―jurisdictions in which they operate.‖
122
  In calling for this elimination of 
facilitation payments, the organization stated that the ―corrupting influence 
of pervasive facilitation payments‖ was something it considered to be 
―insidious‖ and ―part of a wider climate of systemic corruption.‖
123
 
 
corrupt countries in the world.  Id. at 3.  The United States was ranked twenty-second.  Id. at 
2. 
 119. It is worth noting, however, that in January 2003, Beth Aub, one of the founding 
members of Transparency International, resigned her membership with Transparency 
International for, among other things, its toleration of facilitation payments at the time.  See 
Bolaji Abdullahi, Bribery Scandal Rocks Transparency International, THISDAYONLINE (Jan. 
14, 2003), http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2003/01/14/20030114news03.html 
(reporting on the bribery scandal) (link no longer active).  Aub claimed that Transparency 
International at the time had ―repeatedly defended the practice‖ of facilitation payments 
which she found to be wrong.  Id. 
 120. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, BUSINESS PRINCIPLES FOR COUNTERING BRIBERY 5 
(2d ed. 2009), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/private_sector/business_principles. 
 121. Id. at 5-6.  The Business Principles specifically stated that ―[t]he enterprise shall 
prohibit bribery in any form whether direct or indirect‖ and ―[t]he enterprise shall commit to 
implementing a Programme to counter bribery.‖  Id. at 6.  The Business Principles also 
stated that, ―recognizing that facilitation payments are bribes,‖ companies should strive to 
―identify and eliminate them.‖  Id. at 8. 
 122. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, BUSINESS PRINCIPLES FOR COUNTERING BRIBERY: 
GUIDANCE DOCUMENT 23 (2004), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/content/download/573/3493/file/bpcb_ti_guidance_doc_nove
mber_%202004.pdf.  The guidance was designed to assist companies looking to implement 
anti-bribery compliance programs or review their current compliance programs.  Id. at 4. 
 123. Id. at 23.  In this respect, Transparency International stated that ―there should be no 
distinction . . . between the approaches to countering petty and grand bribery.‖  Id.  The 
guidance document then went on to state that where an official makes a demand for a 
facilitation payment that, absent a situation where life or health is threatened, that 
companies should not make the payment.  Id. at 23-24.  It is worth noting that in July 2005, 
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The calls by Transparency International for an end to facilitation 
payments grew louder than ever in 2007, when it adopted a resolution 
specifically calling for an end to facilitation payments.
124
  The ―Resolution 
on Facilitation Payments‖ adopted by Transparency International at its 
annual membership meeting in October 28, 2007, noted that it had ―been 
the long standing policy‖ of Transparency International ―to oppose the use 
of facilitation payments‖ and called on all ―companies to cease making 
such payments immediately.‖
125
  The resolution also stated that 
Transparency International would engage in a campaign to revise all of the 
relevant international treaties and conventions that permitted facilitation 
payments and would also ―advocate, where appropriate, for revisions of 
national and international laws‖ with respect to the permissibility of such 
payments.
126
  Thus, the resolution did more than just call for the cessation 
of facilitation payments.  It also launched a new offensive plan for 
Transparency International to change the laws throughout the world with 
the goal of ending permissible facilitation payments.
127
 
2. World Economic Forum 
World Economic Forum was another international non-governmental 
 
Transparency International also published a ―Six Step Process‖ for implementing a 
compliance program pursuant to the Business Principles.  See TRANSPARENCY 
INTERNATIONAL, BUSINESS PRINCIPLES FOR COUNTERING BRIBERY: TI SIX STEP PROCESS 
(2005), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/global_priorities/private_sector/business_principles/six_step_i
mplementation_process.  This publication, designed to provide practical advice on 
developing an effective compliance program, specifically noted that companies needed to 
analyze ―the prevalence and use‖ of their employees‘ facilitating payments so that the 
company could work to implement a compliance program designed to specifically 
―eliminate‖ them.  Id. at 9. 
 124. See TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, RESOLUTION ON FACILITATION PAYMENTS: 
ADOPTED BY THE TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL ANNUAL MEMBERSHIP MEETING: BALI, 
INDONESIA, 28 OCTOBER 2007 (voicing Transparency International‘s opposition to 
facilitation payments). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  In a subsequent press release by Transparency International in November 2007, 
the organization stated that ―[c]orporations should . . . act immediately to end the practice of 
‗grease payments‘ or so-called facilitation payments that are outright bribes.‖  Press 
Release, Transparency Int‘l, Transparency Int‘l Calls for Action to Enforce the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention (Nov. 20, 2007), available at 
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2007/2007_11_21_ti_c
all_for_action_oecd.  And, most recently, in its annual Global Corruption Report for 2009, 
Transparency International again criticized facilitation payments and noted that there was a 
―diminishing tolerance‖ for such payments in the world.  GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 
2009: CORRUPTION AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR, supra note 118, at 120-21. 
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organization that called for an end to facilitation payments.
128
  In 2004, the 
World Economic Forum, an international organization focusing on 
corporate governance, launched a ―Partnering Against Corruption 
Initiative‖ designed to develop principles for the purposes of providing ―a 
competitive level playing field.‖
129
  In 2005 the Initiative came out with its 
―Principles for Countering Bribery‖ (―PACI Principles‖) which, like the 
Business Principles, stated that companies should follow a policy of 
prohibiting bribery ―in any form,‖ and implement that policy through an 
internal compliance program.
130
  The PACI Principles then specifically 
recommended that the internal compliance program support the elimination 
of facilitation payments.
131
  In recommending the elimination of facilitation 
payments, the PACI Principles stressed that facilitation payments were 
prohibited in almost every country in the world.
132
 
C. TRACE Survey: International Private Sector‟s Limited Use of 
Facilitation Payments 
The building international storm over the issue of facilitation 
payments also impacted the international private sector‘s perception and 
use of these payments.  In October 2009, TRACE, a non-profit 
organization that focuses on anti-bribery compliance for multinational 
companies, published a global survey which revealed that many 
international companies had avoided or prohibited the use of facilitation 
 
 128. The World Economic Forum is ―an independent, international organization‖ that is 
―striving towards a world-class corporate governance system where values are as important 
a basis as rules.‖  About Us, WORLD ECON. FORUM, (Apr. 19, 2011), available at 
http://www.weforum.org/content/leadership-team.  Its motto is ―entrepreneurship in the 
global public interest.‖  Id. 
 129. Partnering Against Corruption Initiative, WORLD ECON. FORUM, (Apr. 19, 2011), 
available at http://www.weforum.org/issues.  As a result of the initiative, more than 110 
companies throughout the world have certified that they have taken steps to make sure that 
they and no persons on their behalf will commit bribery.  See Gail Dutton, Do Strong Ethics 
Hurt U.S. Global Competitiveness?, WORLD TRADE (Mar. 2, 2008), 
http://www.worldtrademag.com/Articles/Feature_Article/BNP_GUID_9-5-
2006_A_10000000000000274420 (reporting on initiatives to prevent corporate bribery). 
 130. WORLD ECON. FORUM, PARTNERING AGAINST CORRUPTION – PRINCIPLES FOR 
COUNTERING BRIBERY 11 (2005) [hereinafter PACI PRINCIPLES].  The Principles were the 
product of a task force of companies of the World Economic Forum ―in partnership with 
Transparency International and the Basel Institute on Governance.‖  Id. at 7. 
 131. Id. at 13; see also PACI PRINCIPLES, supra note 130, at 13; F. Joseph Warin, 
Michael S. Diamant & Jill M. Pfenning, FCPA Compliance in China and the Gifts and 
Hospitality Challenge, 5 VA. L. REV. 33, 65 (2010) (stating that the PACI Principles 
recommended the elimination of facilitating payments). 
 132. Id. 
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payments.
133
  The TRACE Survey, a survey of corporations located 
throughout the world, examined how facilitation payments were ―perceived 
in the international business community‖ and whether they were permitted 
by corporations.  The TRACE Survey came out with several major 
findings.
134
  The most significant finding was that over seventy percent of 
those surveyed believed that their company ―never, or only rarely‖ made 
facilitation payments, even when company policies permitted them.
135
  In 
addition, seventy-six percent of international corporations felt that it was 
possible to successfully do business without having to make facilitation 
payments, ―given sufficient management support and careful planning.‖
136
  
Further, ninety-three percent of those surveyed stated that their jobs would 
be ―easier, or at least no different, if facilitation payments were prohibited 
in every country‖ in the world.
137
 
The TRACE Survey results were significant because they exposed a 
trend among the international corporations that responded to the survey to 
avoid using facilitation payments.
138
  The survey also revealed a clear 
―awareness‖ by these international corporations of the ―added risk‖ and 
difficulties associated with making these payments.
139
  To this end, these 
international corporations overwhelmingly favored an ideal business 
environment where facilitation payments were banned in every country 
throughout the world.
140
 
VI. DIMINISHING DOMESTIC ACCEPTANCE FOR FACILITATION PAYMENTS 
DURING THE FIRST DECADE OF THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION 
The growing unpopularity of facilitation payments was not limited to 
the international stage during the first decade of the Convention, 
unpopularity grew domestically as well.  Several commentators have 
remarked that the scope of the facilitation payments exception has 
 
 133. See TRACE SURVEY, supra note 33, at 2 (reporting on corporate bribery 
prevention); see also News Release, TRACE, TRACE Releases the Results of Facilitation 
Payments Survey (Oct. 15, 2009), available at 
https://www.traceinternational.org/news/TRACEFacilitationPaymentsSurveyResults.asp 
(reporting on corporate policies on facilitation payments). 
 134. TRACE SURVEY, supra note 33, at 2. 
 135. Id.  Forty-four percent of those surveyed stated that their company prohibited 
facilitation payments or did ―not address them‖ because such payments were ―prohibited 
together with other forms of bribery.‖  Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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narrowed over time.
141
  Recent surveys have also revealed that domestic 
businesses, like their foreign counterparts, have increasingly prohibited the 
use of facilitation payments within their operations.
142
 
A. Perceived Narrowing of the Facilitation Payments Exception 
Several commentators have expressed their belief that there has been a 
trend within the United States and enforcement of the FCPA that has led to 
a narrowing in the scope of the facilitation payments exception.
143
  These 
commentators have argued that the relevant regulatory authorities 
enforcing the FCPA, the DOJ and SEC, have construed, and will continue 
to construe, the exception more narrowly over time.
144
 
In United States v. Kay, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit was one of the first major courts to look at the facilitation 
payments exception since the Convention was ratified.
145
  In that case the 
Fifth Circuit agreed with the United States government‘s argument that the 
facilitation payments exception was a very limited exception to the 
otherwise broad sweep of the FCPA.
146
  The court reviewed the statutory 
language of the FCPA, including the legislative history behind it, and found 
that Congress had indeed intended to make the facilitation exception a very 
limited one.
147
  The court noted that: 
A brief review of the types of routine governmental actions 
enumerated by Congress shows how limited Congress wanted to 
make the grease exceptions.  Routine governmental action, for 
instance, includes ―obtaining permits, licenses, or other official 
documents to qualify a person to do business in a foreign 
country,‖ and ―scheduling inspections associated with contract 
performance or inspections related to transit of goods across the 
country.‖  Therefore, routine governmental action does not 
include the issuance of every official document or every 
inspection but only (1) documentation that qualifies a party to do 
business and (2) scheduling an inspection—very narrow 
 
 141. David M. Howard & Elisa T. Wiygul, FCPA Compliance: The Vanishing 
“Facilitating Payments” Exception?, DECHERTONPOINT, Apr. 2010, at 2; see also Fox, 
supra note 33, at 3. 
 142. See infra notes 156-60 and accompanying discussion. 
 143. Patricia Brown Holmes & Valarie Hays, Grease Payments are a Thing of the Past 
as the Reach of the FCPA Continues to Expand, 3 BLOOMBERG L. REP. 1 (2010); see also 
Howard & Wiygul, supra note 141, at 1; Fox, supra note 33, at 3. 
 144. Holmes & Hays, supra note 143, at 1; Howard and Wiygul, supra note 141, at 1; 
Fox, supra note 33, at 3. 
 145. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 146. Id. at 745. 
 147. Id. at 750. 
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categories of largely non-discretionary, ministerial activities 
performed by mid- or low-level foreign functionaries.
148
 
In finding that the exception was to be interpreted on a very narrow 
basis, the court noted that ―in contrast‖ with these provisions, the FCPA 
contained broad language prohibiting bribery, instead of detailed language 
like that of the exception.
149
 
Some commentators have argued that since Kay, government 
regulators have continued to narrow the scope of the facilitation payments 
exception.
150
  These commentators believe that government regulators have 
begun to bring enforcement actions concerning payments that are not 
clearly facilitation payments.
151
  For example, some commentators were 
concerned over the settled enforcement action in Helmerich & Payne in 
that they perceived the action to involve facilitation payments not 
necessarily forbidden by the FCPA.
152
  In this regard, some commentators 
have expressed concerns that the exception will continue to be interpreted 
in a narrow fashion and, as a result, the exception will continue to remain a 
gray area in the law.
153
 
 
 148. Id. at 750-51 (emphasis by the court). 
 149. Id. at 751.  For an in depth analysis on United States v. Kay, see Hector Gonzalez & 
Claudius Sokenu, Scope of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act‟s Bribery Provisions Set, 231 
N.Y. L.J. 1 (2005) (discussing Kay and how that case officially set the scope of the FCPA); 
see also Claudius O. Sokenu, FCPA Enforcement after United States v. Kay: SEC and DOJ 
Team Up to Increase Consequences of FCPA Violations, 1619 PLI/CORP 189 (2007) 
(examining enforcement of the FCPA post-Kay). 
 150. John K. Carroll & Lisa K. Marino, The Incredible Shrinking FCPA Facilitation 
Payment Exception, 241 N.Y. L.J. S6 (2009). 
 151. Id.; see also Holmes & Hays, supra note 143, at 1-2. 
 152. See Howard & Wiygul, supra note 141, at 3-4.  The commentators expressed their 
concerns that the case involved payments made to customs authorities for ―avoiding 
potential delays‖ associated with the transportation of parts, payments these commentators 
believed could be considered facilitation payments.  Id.; see also Press Release 09-741, 
Dep‘t of Justice, Helmerich & Payne Agrees to Pay $1 Million Penalty to Resolve 
Allegations of Foreign Bribery in South America (July 30, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/July/09-crm-741.html.  The company had entered into a 
two-year deferred or non-prosecution agreement with the DOJ.  See id.  The SEC‘s settled 
action with the company involved allegations that the company had violated the FCPA‘s 
accounting provisions. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., SEC Adm. Proc. File No. 3-13565, at 4-5 
(July 30, 2009); SEC News Digest, Issue 2009-145, July 30, 2009.  As noted before, the 
facilitation payment exception does not apply to the FCPA‘s accounting provisions.  See 
supra notes 31-32, and accompanying discussion.  Thus, if a company records certain 
relevant payments improperly, as alleged in this particular case, it can still be liable under 
the FCPA‘s accounting provisions, notwithstanding whether the payments actually 
constituted facilitation payments.  Id. 
 153. Carroll & Marino, supra note 150, at S6; Holmes & Hays, supra note 143, at 1-2. 
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B. Domestic Companies‟ Avoidance of Facilitation Payments 
Like their international counterparts, most domestic companies now 
prohibit the use of facilitation payments.
154
  This may be for several 
reasons, such as the growing unpopularity of facilitation payments 
overseas, or the apparent complexities involved in complying with the gray 
area of the exception itself.  Whatever the reason, most domestic 
companies have affirmatively sought to ban or narrow the use of 
facilitation payments within their operations.
155
 
1. Surveys Reveal that Most Domestic Companies Prohibit the Use 
of Facilitation Payments   
A 2008 survey by the law firm of Fulbright & Jaworski concerning 
facilitation payments (―Fulbright Survey‖) found that eighty percent of 
companies in the United States prohibited the use of facilitation 
payments.
156
  The survey also found that nearly two-thirds of domestic 
companies had policies expressly prohibiting the making of facilitation 
payments.
157
  The survey further revealed that a majority of domestic 
companies felt that it was better to ban facilitation payments altogether than 
―explore a gray area inviting costly and embarrassing investigations for 
FCPA violations.‖
158
 
Around the same time as the Fulbright Survey, the accounting firm 
KPMG conducted a survey of executives at United States multinational 
corporations and came out with similar findings.
159
  In the KPMG survey, 
 
 154. Fulbright & Jaworski, 2008 Litigation Trends Survey shows U.S. Companies 
Preparing for Rise in Litigation Following Two Years of Declines, BUS. WIRE, Oct. 14, 
2008, at 8 [hereinafter Fulbright Survey]. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id.  The survey involved a poll of corporate law departments.  Id.; see also Joel M. 
Cohen & Adam P. Wolf, Narrow, Don‟t Abolish, FCPA Facilitating Payments Exception, 
244 N.Y. L.J. 1 (2010); Roger M. Witten, Recent Developments in FCPA and Global Anti-
bribery Enforcement, 1814 PLI/CORP 901 (2010). 
 157. Fulbright Survey, supra note 154, at 8. 
 158. Id.  The survey noted that twenty percent of the billion dollar companies polled had 
undertaken a bribery or corruption investigation in the past year.  Id.  The survey also found 
that twenty-three percent of United States companies had ―made the decision to walk away 
from doing business in a country based on the perceived degree of local corruption.‖  Id.; 
see also FCPA Takes Bite into Company Activities, COMPLIANCE REPORTER, Oct. 17, 2008 
(explaining the effect of the FCPA exception on companies and that companies have 
reassessed whether to do ―business in a country based on the perceived degree of local 
corruption.‖). 
 159. KPMG Survey Finds Most Global U.S. Companies Face Challenges with their Anti-
Bribery, Anti-Corruption Programs and Activities, PR NEWSWIRE, Nov. 3, 2008.  The 
KPMG Survey was a poll of 103 executives from multinational United States companies. Id. 
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only twenty-five percent of executives surveyed stated that their companies 
still allowed facilitation payments.
160
 
These surveys suggest that domestic companies would rather ban the 
use of facilitation payments than make these kinds of payments and deal 
with the adverse consequences.  Many of these companies have probably 
learned that making such payments will enter them into the complex realm 
of conflicting domestic and international laws regarding the legality of such 
payments.  So, they have simply avoided making them altogether.  As one 
FCPA expert has stated, many companies have decided to ban facilitations 
payments entirely because it is ―an easier, simpler line to draw.‖
161
 
2. The Higher Cost of Facilitation Payments 
Many domestic companies have discovered that making facilitation 
payments can be a very costly endeavor.
162
  Government officials seeking 
bribes target the companies that they know will pay them, and this in turn 
leads to higher costs imposed on those companies that choose to engage in 
this kind of activity.
163
  As one commentator put it, paying a facilitation 
payment or any kind of bribe is equivalent to ―putting a bull‘s eye on your 
company‘s forehead.‖
164
  Those companies that pay them will be targeted 
and will be expected to continue making such payments in the future.
165
 
A study by TRACE in 2003 entitled ―The High Cost of Small Bribes‖ 
supports the position that facilitation payments can be quite costly to 
companies over the long run.
166
  The study found that ―[w]idespread small 
bribes set a permissive tone, which invites more and greater demands.‖
167
  
In this respect, the study revealed that ―entrepreneurial bribe-takers learn to 
focus their demands on companies that have paid bribes before‖ and 
therefore will continue to expect these payments well into the future.
168
  
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Melissa Klein Aguilar, Facilitation Payments still leave Companies Vexed, 
COMPLIANCE WEEK, Dec. 2009, at 12 (quoting Lucinda Low, a partner in the law firm of 
Steptoe & Johnson and expert in the FCPA). 
 162. Dutton, supra note 129. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id.  Alexandra Wrage, president of TRACE, warned that companies paying bribes 
often make themselves a target to foreign officials for the payment of more bribes.  Id. 
 165. Id.  One senior executive equated facilitation payments and ―small-time corruption‖ 
to be like ―low-level cancer‖ in that ―[e]ventually it will kill you.‖  Id. (quoting Tom 
McCoy, executive vice president and chief administrative officer of Advanced Micro 
Devices). 
 166. TRACE, THE HIGH COST OF SMALL BRIBES (2009), available at 
https://www.traceinternational.org/documents/TheHighCostofSmallBribes.pdf. 
 167. Id. at 7. 
 168. Id. 
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The study also concluded that it makes ―better business sense‖ to end the 
practice of making facilitation payments, rather than continuing to making 
such payments.
169
 
Whichever their reasons, whether for compliance, regulatory, or 
simply business motivations, companies in the United States have 
increasingly refrained from making facilitation payments, notwithstanding 
the fact that the FCPA still allows for them.  This domestic undercurrent 
against facilitation payments, flowing parallel to the growing international 
disdain for them, will soon lead the issue into the spotlight on the 
international stage, through actions taken by the OECD. 
VII. OECD CALLS ON SIGNATORY COUNTRIES TO COMBAT AND PROHIBIT 
FACILITATION PAYMENTS 
In late 2009, the OECD changed its stance with respect to its view on 
facilitation payments through the OECD Recommendation.
170
  Rather than 
condemning facilitation payments and calling for their elimination through 
corporate governance programs as it had done before, the OECD instead, 
through the OECD Recommendation, called on countries to directly 
combat facilitation payments and encourage companies under their 
jurisdiction to prohibit them.
171
 
A.  OECD Recommendation 
On November 26, 2009, the OECD adopted the OECD 
Recommendation.
172
  The OECD Recommendation is an agreement by the 
OECD member countries, and eight other countries that signed the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention, to ―put in place new measures‖ designed to 
―reinforce their efforts to prevent, detect and investigate foreign bribery.‖
173
  
 
 169. Id. 
 170. OECD Recommendation, supra note 4, at 4. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 2. 
 173. OECD, Governments Agree to Step Up Fight Against Bribery, (Dec. 9, 2009), 
available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/34/0,3746,en_21571361_44315115_44232739_1_1_1_1,00.
html; OECD Recommendation, supra note 4, at 3.  The thirty OECD member countries and 
eight other countries that signed the Convention, or thirty-eight nations overall, ―make up 
the vast majority of international business deals, accounting for roughly two-thirds of world 
exports and nearly ninety percent of global outward flows of foreign direct investment.‖  
OECD 2009 Report, supra note 77, at 4.  The OECD Recommendation was the product of a 
review of various OECD anti-bribery measures as well as consultations with legal experts, 
international organizations, prosecutors, private-sector representatives, and individuals in 
the accounting and auditing profession.  Id. at 7.  One of the consultation sessions that took 
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December 9, 2009, marked the tenth anniversary of the Convention‘s entry 
into force, and on that day the OECD, at a Transparency International event 
marking ―International Anti-Corruption Day,‖ announced the release of the 
OECD Recommendation.
174
 
One of the key announcements in the OECD Recommendation was 
that the OECD was now calling for an end to permissible facilitation 
payments.
175
  Specifically, the relevant provision in the OECD 
Recommendation dealing with facilitation payments stated that the OECD: 
RECOMMENDS, in view of the corrosive effect of small 
facilitation payments, particularly on sustainable economic 
development and the rule of law that Member countries should: 
i)  undertake to periodically review their policies and approach 
on small facilitation payments in order to effectively combat 
the phenomenon; 
ii) encourage companies to prohibit or discourage the use of 
small facilitation payments in internal company controls, 
ethics and compliance programmes or measures, recognising 
that such payments are generally illegal in the countries where 
they are made, and must in all cases be accurately accounted 
for in such companies‘ books and financial records.
176
 
This recommendation represented a stronger and more aggressive 
position taken from the OECD against facilitation payments, because it 
called on both governments and companies to prohibit and end the use of 
facilitation payments.
177
  As it applied to governments, the OECD 
Recommendation stated that signatory countries, including the United 
States, should review their policies and approach on ―corrosive‖ facilitation 
payments in order to ―effectively combat the phenomenon‖ of facilitation 
 
place in October 2009 specifically focused on the issue of facilitation payments.  Id. at 83. 
 174. Governments Agree to Step Up Fight Against Bribery, supra note 173; Good News 
at Today‟s OECD Celebration, TRACEBLOG (Dec. 9, 2009, 2:21 PM), available at  
http://traceblog.org/2009/12/09/good-news-at-todays-oecd-celebration/.  The day was 
marked with great fanfare and involved OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría and U.S. 
Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke jointly unveiling the OECD Recommendation via video 
from Washington D.C.  Id.  Video-recorded remarks from U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton marked the opening of the celebration.  Id. 
 175. OECD Recommendation, supra note 4, at 4; R. Christopher Cook & Stephanie L. 
Connor, United States: OECD Calls for an End to Facilitating Payments Exception, 
MONDAQ (Dec. 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=91384.  On this day, the OECD 
also launched a so-called ―Initiative to Raise Global Awareness of Foreign Bribery,‖ which 
is a three-year initiative designed to engage the public and ―convince them that foreign 
bribery carries a heavy price, that it is a serious crime and that it is no longer a part of 
business as usual.‖  OECD 2009 Report, supra note 77, at 12-13. 
 176. OECD Recommendation, supra note 4, at 4. 
 177. Id. 
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payments.
178
  One could perceive this as a call on all five countries that 
have laws permitting the use of facilitation payments overseas, including 
the United States, to review their policies and laws relevant to these 
payments with a view towards prohibiting them.
179
  And as it pertains to the 
United States, one could perceive this to mean that the United States should 
review its policies regarding facilitation payments, and the FCPA‘s 
exception for them, with a view towards changing those policies, and 
potentially amending the FCPA, to effectively ―combat‖ the use of them.
180
 
The OECD Recommendation also called on signatory countries to 
encourage companies within their jurisdictions to prohibit or discourage the 
use of facilitation payments through their internal controls, ethics and 
compliance programs.
181
  With respect to the United States, this would 
mean that the United States government would have to ―encourage‖ 
domestic companies to prohibit the use of facilitation payments, through 
their internal company controls, ethics and compliance programs, even 
though such facilitation payments might still be allowable under the 
FCPA.
182
 
The OECD Recommendation‘s provisions regarding facilitation 
payments present an interesting irony with respect to the United States and 
the FCPA.  While the OECD Recommendation calls on the United States to 
review its approach towards facilitation payments in the FCPA with a view 
towards combating and prohibiting them, and calls on the United States to 
encourage domestic corporations to prohibit such payments through 
internal controls and compliance programs, what will happen if the United 
States delays or takes no action with respect to the FCPA‘s facilitation 
payments exception?  Is it still obligated to ―encourage‖ companies to 
prohibit facilitation payments?  Even though the FCPA still allows for 
them?  Policy-wise, the United States could still ―encourage‖ domestic 
companies to prohibit the use of facilitation payments, while still allowing 
for them under the FCPA, knowing how such activity can be harmful to 
 
 178. Id. It is interesting that the OECD expressed its disdain for facilitation payments by 
including strong language about the ―corrosive effect‖ of such payments—language that is 
similar to the ―corrosive phenomenon‖ language previously used by it in describing 
facilitation payments in the Convention.  Id.; see also OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 
supra note 3, at Commentary 9. 
 179. See OECD Recommendation, supra note 4, at 4. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id.  Another relevant provision relating to facilitation payments in the OECD 
Recommendation stated that the OECD ―[urges] all countries to raise awareness of their 
public officials on their domestic bribery and solicitation laws with a view to stopping the 
solicitation and acceptance of small facilitation payments.‖  Id.  This provision appeared to 
be directed to countries where public officials receive facilitation payments and seeks to 
repress the demand-side of facilitation payments.  Id. 
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domestic companies given that most foreign countries‘ domestic laws 
prohibit them.  This would be analogous to the United States government 
encouraging its citizens not to smoke, while still allowing them to legally 
do so, despite knowledge that smoking can be detrimental to their health.  
Whether the United States will take such an approach, or legally prohibit 
the permissible use of facilitation payments altogether within the FCPA, 
remains to be seen. 
B. New Phase 3 OECD Monitoring 
Coinciding with the announcement of the OECD Recommendation, 
the OECD Working Group adopted a new third round of monitoring related 
to the Convention in December 2009.
183
  The Phase 3 monitoring, which 
began in 2010, focused on enforcement of the Convention and any 
outstanding recommendations made during the first two phases of 
monitoring.
184
  With respect to the United States and the issue of facilitation 
payments, Phase 3 monitoring also focused on how countries had been 
implementing the OECD Recommendation.
185
  Like the previous two 
phases of monitoring, the Working Group planned to publish its 
recommendations with respect to its evaluation at the end of the monitoring 
process.
186
 
C.  Good Practice Guidance 
A few months after the OECD Recommendation, on February 18, 
2010, the OECD adopted and published, as part of the OECD 
Recommendation, its Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, 
and Compliance (―Good Practice Guidance‖).
187
  The Good Practice 
Guidance, a set of standards for companies to follow in establishing 
effective internal controls and compliance programs designed to detect and 
 
 183. OECD 2009 Report, supra note 77, at 14. 
 184. Id. at 14-15. 
 185. Id. at 14. 
 186. OECD 2009 Report, supra note 77. 
 187. OECD, Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics, and Compliance, 
(Feb. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Good Practice Guidance].  The Good Practice Guidance was 
adopted as an ―integral part‖ of the Recommendation and became Annex II to the 
Recommendation itself.  Id.; OECD Recommendation, supra note 4, at 1.  OECD Secretary-
General Angel Gurría announced the Good Practice Guidance on March 3, 2010, as ―the 
most comprehensive guidance ever provided to companies and business organisations by an 
international organization‖ on the issue of anti-bribery internal controls and compliance 
programs.  Press Release, OECD, OECD Calls on Businesses to Step Up Their Fight 
Against Bribery (Mar. 3, 2010) (quoting OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría). 
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prevent foreign bribery, was the first time a set of international anti-bribery 
compliance standards had been endorsed by multiple governments.
188
 
On the issue of facilitation payments, the Good Practice Guidance 
called on companies to adopt compliance programs or measures designed 
to address facilitation payments.
189
  More specifically, the Good Practice 
Guidance recommended that companies consider ―ethics and compliance 
programmes or measures designed to prevent and detect foreign bribery 
applicable to all directors, officers, and employees, and applicable to all 
entities over which a company has effective control‖ in the area of 
―facilitation payments.‖
190
 
D. Initial Domestic Response to the OECD‟s Call for an End to 
Facilitation Payments 
The OECD‘s new position in calling for an end to facilitation 
payments represented an important development in the international anti-
bribery arena.  While the OECD Recommendation is not technically a part 
of the Convention, and the OECD does not have any power to force the 
new legislation or laws of any relevant country as a result of its 
 
 188. Id.; Good Practice Guidance, supra note 187, at 2.  The Good Practices Guidance, 
among other things, essentially called on companies to adopt a ―clear and visible‖ policy on 
anti-bribery, ensure compliance with such policy ―at all levels‖ within their organizations, 
and provide ―regular communication and training‖ on the issue of foreign bribery to both 
employees and ―business partners.‖  OECD Calls on Businesses to Step Up their Fight 
Against Bribery, supra note 187. 
 189. Good Practice Guidance, supra note 187, at 3. 
 190. Id.  The Good Practice Guidance appeared to have received the endorsement of the 
DOJ at the time that it came out.  See David Heckler, „Roided Up Enforcement: DOJ Unit 
that Prosecutes FCPA to Bulk up „Substantially,‟ CORPORATE COUNSEL, Feb. 25, 2010 
(suggesting the DOJ‘s endorsement of the Good Practice Guidance).  Mark Mendelsohn, the 
Deputy Chief of the Fraud Section at the DOJ‘s Criminal Division in February 2010, was 
reported to have stated in a speech at the time that the OECD would be publishing its Good 
Practice Guidance and that such guidance would arrive with the approval of the DOJ.  Id.  
Mendelsohn provided the comments during a speaking engagement at the Global Ethics 
Summit 2010 in New York City.  Id.; see also Melissa Klein Aguilar, OECD Anti-Bribery 
Guide as Path to FCPA Compliance, COMPLIANCE WEEK, Mar. 30, 2010 (stating that 
Mendelsohn announced the DOJ‘s approval of the OECD guidance at a February 2010 anti-
corruption conference).  A DOJ spokesman declined to make Mendelsohn available for 
further comment at the time.  Id.  Mendelsohn has since moved on to the private sector.  In a 
recent interview, Mendelsohn described the Good Practice Guidance as a ―high-water mark‖ 
as far as best practices for preventing and detecting bribery and said that his role in the 
drafting and adoption of the Good Practice Guidance was ―one of the things‖ that he was the 
―most proud of‖ from his time at the DOJ.  Recent Top DOJ Official Shares Insights into 
FCPA Policies, Enforcement Strategies, Public-Private Cooperation and Role of the OECD, 
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNSEL, Aug. 2, 2010 (quoting Mark F. Mendelsohn of Paul, 
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP). 
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recommendations, any message or recommendation from the OECD still 
carries tremendous weight.
191
  One would imagine that it would be very 
difficult for the United States, the country who approached the OECD as a 
means for seeking an international agreement against foreign bribery, to 
ignore the OECD‘s calls.  The United States has not appeared to have done 
so—at least not yet.
192
 
Between the time of the OECD Recommendation and the OECD‘s 
Phase 3 Report on the United States, there were no legislative or regulatory 
developments to change or eliminate the facilitation payments exception.  
However there was a lot of talk on the issue.  At least one commentator 
expressed an opinion that there would likely be an effort by the United 
States to amend the FCPA to eliminate the exception.
193
  In addition, a 
couple of senior DOJ officials also weighed in on the issue.  On April 8, 
2010, Charles Duross, an Assistant Chief with the Fraud Section at the 
DOJ‘s Criminal Division, indicated during a panel discussion that the DOJ 
was ―not encouraging‖ facilitation payments.
194
  And on May 26, 2010, 
Lanny Breuer, the Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ‘s Criminal 
Division, indicated during a conference that the DOJ was open to revisiting 
the exception.
195
  In his remarks, Breuer stated that revisiting the exception 
was something ―worth discussing‖ and that he did not necessarily ―rule . . . 
out‖ such a revisit happening.
196
 
 
 191. See Cook & Connor, supra note 175 (stating that ―[a]lthough the OECD has no 
power to enact legislation, the organization has been the primary force behind the 
promulgation of anticorruption laws‖). 
 192. Indeed, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke and U.S. Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton provided positive remarks during the OECD‘s announcement of the OECD 
Recommendation.  See Governments Agree to Step Up Fight Against Bribery, supra note 
173.  In her remarks, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that ―the United States 
fully supports the OECD‘s anti-corruption agenda.‖  Id. 
 193. A Fresh Look at the FCPA, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNSEL, Feb. 1, 2010 
(Interview of R. Christopher Cook of Jones Day). 
 194. Christopher M. Matthews, Compliance Monitors are Here to Stay, MAIN JUSTICE, 
Apr. 8, 2010 (quoting Charles Duross, Assistant Chief, Fraud Section, Criminal Division, 
Department of Justice).  The comments were made at an event entitled ―Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act: What you Need to Know,‖ hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations on 
April 8, 2010.  Id. 
 195. Christopher M. Matthews, Breuer: Facilitating Payments Worth Discussing, MAIN 
JUSTICE, May 26, 2010.  The comments were made at the Compliance Week Fifth Annual 
Conference.  Id. 
 196. Id. (quoting Lanny Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice).  
Breuer also noted that while he was ―not currently aware of any real movement to make that 
change‖ in the United States, that he thought that ―as other countries[‘] laws evolve and 
mature . . . I suspect over time, we too will be modifying our law.‖  Id. 
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VIII. OECD APPLIES PRESSURE ON THE UNITED STATES IN THE OECD 
PHASE 3 REPORT 
On October 15, 2010, the OECD Working Group came out with its 
Phase 3 Report on the United States.
197
  The Phase 3 review, designed to 
look at both the outstanding recommendations made during the first two 
phases of monitoring, as well as how the United States was putting the 
OECD Recommendation into action, marked the first time the United 
States and the FCPA had faced a review by the OECD since the OECD‘s 
initial call for the elimination of facilitation payments in the OECD 
Recommendation.
198
 
A. OECD Phase 3 Report on the United States 
The OECD Phase 3 Report criticized the United States for its policies 
on facilitation payments, yet praised the country for encouraging domestic 
companies to prohibit the use of facilitation payments in their operations.
199
 
1. Criticism of the United States over its Policies and Approach on 
Facilitation Payments 
With respect to the first key recommendation in the OECD 
Recommendation that ―in view of the corrosive effect of small facilitation 
payments,‖ member countries ―undertake to periodically review their 
policies and approach on small facilitation payments in order to effectively 
combat the phenomenon,‖ the OECD once again criticized the United 
States for what it perceived to be a lack of guidance on the FCPA‘s 
facilitation payments exception.
200
  On this issue, the OECD noted that it 
had previously recommended that the United States consider developing 
 
 197. Phase 3 Report, supra note 1. 
 198. See id. at 6.  Interestingly, the United States did not shy away from the Phase 3 
review, and the challenges that would come under it, but volunteered to be one of the first 
countries to come under the review.  Press Release, OECD, U.S. 1 of First 2 Volunteers to 
Undergo Rigorous Phase 3 Peer Review, United States Mission to the OECD, Oct. 13, 2010, 
available at http://usoecd.usmission.gov/antibribery-phase-3.html.  In volunteering for the 
review, U.S. Ambassador to the OECD Karen Kornbluth stated that ―[w]e were pleased to 
be among the first countries to go under the magnifying glass of peer scrutiny at the OECD 
Phase 3 review.‖  Id. (quoting U.S. Ambassador to the OECD Karen Kornbluth).  She stated 
that ―[a]s one of the first two volunteers to be reviewed, the U.S. is setting a high standard 
for the ‗race to the top‘ expected of all Convention signatories.‖  Id. 
 199. See Phase 3 Report, supra note 1, at 22-24. 
 200. Id.; OECD Recommendation, supra note 4, at 4.  This was a criticism previously 
noted in the second phases of review.  See supra notes 115 through 117 and accompanying 
discussion. 
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―specific guidance on the application‖ of the exception but that the United 
States had not done so.
201
  The OECD also repeated its criticism of the 
exception for failing to limit it to ―small‖ payments, as provided under 
Commentary 9 to the Convention.
202
 
Of particular interest in the Phase 3 Report is its indication that the 
United States would continue to review its policies on facilitation 
payments.
203
  Specifically, the Working Group stated that DOJ Assistant 
Attorney General Breuer had told them during a welcoming address that 
the exception would continue to come under United States review, as 
recommended by the OECD Recommendation.
204
  To this end, the Working 
Group suggested that the United States consider comments by compliance 
experts and the private sector in any such continued review, noting that 
most of the compliance experts and private sector representatives that they 
had spoken with had felt that the exception was unclear or needed further 
guidance.
205
 
2. Praise for United States Encouragement of Companies to Prohibit 
or Discourage Facilitation Payments 
Unlike the criticism of the United States for its policies on facilitation 
payments, the Phase 3 Report praised the United States for steps taken to 
comply with the second core part of the OECD Recommendation—that the 
United States ―encourage companies to prohibit or discourage the use of 
 
 201. Phase 3 Report, supra note 1, at 22-24.  The OECD noted, however, that the DOJ 
had responded to its concerns in this area by noting that no one from the private sector had 
ever submitted a ―request for an Opinion Procedure Release on the application of the 
exception‖ and therefore it believed that there was sufficient guidance out in the public 
concerning the exception.  Id. at 23.  The United States had also stated that the defense bar 
―rarely‖ raised the exception during enforcement actions and therefore that the FCPA bar 
understood the exception and found it to be ―clear.‖  Id. at 23. 
 202. Id. at 23-24; OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3, at Commentary 9.  This 
was another criticism previously noted in the second phase of review.  See supra note 112 
and accompanying discussion. 
 203. See id. at 24 (―[T]he exception for facilitation payments will continue to come 
under review . . . .‖); see also OECD Recommendation, supra note 4, at 4. 
 204. Phase 3 Report, supra note 1, at 24. 
 205. See id.  The Working Group noted that all of the representatives from the business 
sectors that they had spoken with had the opinion ―that the scope‖ of the facilitation 
payment exception was ―unclear.‖  Id.  The Working Group also noted that all but one of the 
compliance experts that they had spoken with believed that further guidance was necessary.  
Id.  The Phase 3 Report specifically recommended that the ―the United States, in its periodic 
review of facilitation payment pursuant to the OECD Recommendation, consider the views 
of the private sector and civil society, particularly on ways of clarifying the ‗grey‘ areas 
identified by them.‖  Id. 
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small facilitation payments.‖
206
  The United States, in response to questions 
from the Phase 3 review, noted several steps that it had undertaken to be 
proactive in encouraging companies to prohibit or discourage the use of 
facilitation payments.
207
  The United States stated that the SEC‘s Division 
of Enforcement had been ―instrumental in encouraging companies to 
prohibit or discourage the use of small facilitation payments and ensure 
that, where they are made, they are accurately accounted for in companies‘ 
books and financial records by instituting actions against public companies 
that fail in this regard.‖
208
  The United States also noted that DOJ, SEC and 
United States Department of Commerce officials had spoken at numerous 
anti-bribery conferences where these officials ―encouraged companies to 
prohibit or discourage the use of small facilitation payments.‖
209
  The Phase 
3 Report stated that ―civil society . . . welcomed recent public statements 
by the United States government that ma[d]e it very clear that [facilitation] 
payments are not condoned and that companies should take steps to 
eliminate them.‖
210
  The report then noted that the evaluators commended 
the United States for ―recent steps taken in line‖ with the OECD 
Recommendation ―to encourage companies to prohibit or discourage the 
use of facilitation payments.‖
211
 
The Phase 3 Report that came out in October 2010 was not the end of 
the Phase 3 review.  In fact, the Phase 3 review is scheduled to go on for at 
least another two years, during which time the OECD will continue to 
apply pressure on the United States to review its policies on facilitation 
payments.  The United States is scheduled to do an oral report to follow up 
on its implementation of key recommendations made by the Working 
Group after one year of the Phase 3 Report.
212
  The United States will next 
be required to submit a written report on these issues within two years of 
the report, which will then be the subject of a publicly available evaluation 
by the Working Group concerning its implementation of the relevant 
recommendations.
213
 
 
 206. Id.; see also OECD Recommendation, supra note 4, at 4. 
 207. OECD Working Group on Bribery, Response of the United States Questions 
Concerning Phase 3, at 42-43 (May 3, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/response3.pdf. 
 208. Id. at 42. 
 209. Id. at 43 
 210. Phase 3 Report, supra note 1, at 24. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Press Release, OECD, United States: OECD Recognizes Anti-Bribery Enforcement 
and Recommends Enhancement (Oct. 20, 2010). 
 213. Id. 
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IX. POTENTIAL FUTURE EFFORTS BY THE OECD TO END FACILITATION 
PAYMENTS 
It will be interesting to see what the United States will do with respect 
to facilitation payments given the continued pressure by the OECD.  If 
nothing is done by the end of the Phase 3 review, it would not be surprising 
if the OECD considered a repeal of Commentary 9 to the Convention.
214
  
After all, it seems hypocritical for the OECD to call for an end to 
facilitation payments, and criticize the United States and the FCPA‘s 
exception for them, when the OECD and the Convention itself still allows 
for such payments.
215
 
It is therefore this author‘s prediction that if the United States does not 
address and end the facilitation payments exception during the OECD‘s 
Phase 3 review, that the OECD may repeal, or at least seriously consider a 
repeal of, Commentary 9 to the Convention.  This would place the OECD 
in a high-stakes game against the United States, since such a repeal would 
potentially force the United States to either eliminate the facilitation 
payments exception as a means for complying with the Convention, or drop 
out of the Convention altogether.  The OECD may be hesitant to pose such 
a challenge on the United States.  However, given the OECD‘s call for an 
end to facilitation payments, it will be hard for the OECD to continue to 
allow Commentary 9 to be a part of the Convention. 
X. PREDICTION THAT THE FCPA‘S FACILITATION PAYMENTS EXCEPTION 
WILL EVENTUALLY BE ELIMINATED 
The United States, through the enactment of the FCPA, was the first 
country to address the problems of foreign bribery and global corruption.  
In doing so, it placed domestic companies at a competitive disadvantage to 
their foreign counterparts as a result of the FCPA.  The legislators thus 
provided a facilitation payments exception as a means for easing the burden 
on domestic companies.
216
  At the time, at least during the creation of the 
FCPA, it seemed like the reasonable thing to do.  Yet, when the United 
States originally provided for the facilitation payments exception, it never 
truly accepted the morality of such facilitation payments, viewing such 
payments as ―reprehensible,‖ and only allowing for them because they 
were ―not necessarily‖ viewed reprehensible ―elsewhere in the world.‖
217
 
Things are different now.  Most of the civilized world no longer 
 
 214. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3, at Commentary 9. 
 215. Id. 
 216. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying discussion. 
 217. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977). 
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condones facilitation payments.
218
  The 1988 Amendments, calling on the 
United States government to pursue an international anti-bribery treaty 
through the OECD, set in motion an ever-growing snowball against 
facilitation payments.
219
  The United States approached the OECD for an 
international anti-bribery treaty, the OECD followed up with the 
Convention, countries implemented the Convention into their own foreign 
anti-bribery laws, and now most of the civilized world has laws outlawing 
foreign bribery.
220
  The world caught up to the United States on the foreign 
bribery front.  But on the issue of facilitation payments, the world 
continued to move forward as well.  As a result, the FCPA, the first and 
premier foreign anti-bribery law, has been left behind with respect to its 
permissibility for facilitation payments.  And while the FCPA contains 
several core provisions that will always withstand the test of time, the 
facilitation payments exception is out of date in this modern-day era of 
commerce and sensibility. 
It is therefore this author‘s opinion that the FCPA will be amended to 
end the facilitation payments exception.  The United States will do so 
mainly because of the international pressure, including that from the 
OECD, to eliminate the exception.  And while the United States will not 
necessarily have to bend to international pressure, it is doubtful that it will 
fight such pressure in defending an unpopular exception for an activity that 
it considers ―reprehensible‖ and is ―encouraging‖ domestic companies to 
avoid.
221
  Instead, the United States, as the leading nation in pursuing 
foreign bribery, will eliminate the facilitation payments exception so that it 
can catch up with the rest of the world in banning such payments, instead 
of trailing or lagging behind.
222
 
This author also believes that, while we are eventually headed down a 
path towards the elimination of the facilitation payments exception, such an 
elimination will not happen in the near future.  The facilitation payments 
exception became law through the relevant statute of the FCPA and the 
very act of repealing that law will require legislative amendments to the 
FCPA, a difficult and time-consuming process. 
223
  Furthermore, without a 
 
 218. See TRACE SURVEY, supra note 33, at 2; Aguilar, supra note 33; Fox, supra note 33, 
at 3. 
 219. See 1988 Amendments, supra note 10. 
 220. See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 3; TRACE SURVEY, supra note 33, 
at 2. 
 221. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977); Response of the United States Questions 
Concerning Phase 3 OECD Working Group on Bribery, supra note 207, at 42-43.  In 
addition, eighty percent of domestic companies have already prohibited the practice of 
making facilitation payments.  See Fulbright Survey, supra note 154, at 8. 
 222. Sokenu, supra note 100, at 651-52. 
 223. See Response of the United States Questions Concerning Phase 3 OECD Working 
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strong mandate to amend the FCPA, such as the criticisms that preceded 
the 1988 Amendments and the Convention that preceded the 1998 
Amendments, there may not be an impetus strong enough to get Congress 
to amend the FCPA in the very near future.
224
  Therefore, it may be years 
before the exception will be eliminated.  Nevertheless, this author believes 
that the exception will eventually be eliminated. 
XI. COMPANIES SHOULD PROHIBIT FACILITATION PAYMENTS AS A BEST 
PRACTICE NOW 
As a best practice, companies should ban facilitation payments 
altogether.  Not because they necessarily have to under the FCPA, or 
because the relevant domestic regulatory authorities are encouraging them 
to end the practice, but because it is a best practice that will save them time, 
money, and energy, now and in the future. 
Eighty percent of domestic companies have already banned 
facilitation payments for good reason.
225
  But for those that have not, this 
author recommends that they do so, especially as this global anti-bribery 
environment becomes increasingly hostile to facilitation payments.  
Banning facilitation payments from their operations will allow companies 
to avoid legal liability and the higher costs associated with making such 
payments.  It will also allow them to stay ahead of the regulatory landscape 
that will likely completely prohibit facilitation payments in the near future. 
A.  Avoid Potential Domestic and Foreign Legal Liability Involved in 
Making Facilitation Payments 
Companies should prohibit facilitation payments from their operations 
 
Group on Bribery, supra note 207, at Appendix H.  In an interesting survey done in May 
2009 by the OECD Working Group, the Working Group asked the United States whether it 
was in favor of repealing or maintaining the exception for ―small‖ facilitation payments as 
provided for in Commentary 9.  Id.  In its response, the United States stated that it was in 
favor of maintaining Commentary 9 but then went into the difficulties involved if it would 
be required to change its exception.  Id.  In the response, the United States stated, ―[w]e 
would like to reiterate that the Commentary to the Convention was included in the 
transmittal package sent to the U.S. Senate for approval as part of the Convention 
ratification process and emphasize that such a change would require at a minimum 
consultations with the Senate.‖  Id.  It then stated that ―such a change would require an 
amendment to our criminal statute, which would necessitate approval by both houses of 
Congress.‖  Id. 
 224. See supra notes 51-59, 74-83 and accompanying discussion.   Nevertheless, any 
change to the Convention, such as the elimination of Commentary 9 or otherwise, could 
force the legislators to act and amend the FCPA accordingly. 
 225. Fulbright Survey, supra note 154, at 8. 
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to avoid facing potential adverse legal consequences.  Facilitation 
payments are considered small-time bribes illegal under almost every 
domestic bribery law in the world.
226
  Thus, every time a company 
condones and makes a facilitation payment in an overseas jurisdiction, it 
runs the risk of getting caught and prosecuted under a foreign jurisdiction‘s 
domestic bribery law.  In addition, most countries‘ foreign anti-bribery 
laws criminalize such payments.  For example, the new United Kingdom 
Bribery Act criminalizes foreign bribery and does not provide an exception 
for facilitation payments.
227
  And while the FCPA itself still provides an 
exception for facilitation payments, the exception itself is arguably 
becoming a more gray area of the law and one subject to narrowing 
interpretation.
228
  Thus, even under the FCPA, the making of a facilitation 
payment will oftentimes be a very dangerous endeavor. 
There is also the Catch-22 problem that every time a domestic 
company makes a facilitation payment that is legal under the FCPA, it may 
be illegal under a relevant foreign jurisdiction‘s domestic bribery law.  The 
company could either conceal the payment in violation of the FCPA‘s 
accounting provisions, or properly record the payment and confess to 
making a bribe in violation of a relevant foreign jurisdiction‘s domestic 
bribery law.  Either way, it is a no-win situation.  The domestic company 
making a facilitation payment thus stands to lose and faces legal liability, 
no matter what it does.  This practice just does not make sense, at least not 
from a legal point of view. 
B. Avoid Higher Costs Involved in Making Facilitation Payments 
Another reason why companies should prohibit facilitation payments 
within their operations is that they are very costly.  There is a complex 
matrix of domestic and foreign anti-bribery laws that companies must 
navigate when making facilitation payments, and steering through that 
matrix can be a compliance nightmare and a costly legal undertaking.  The 
costs involved in making facilitation payments are likely to overwhelm any 
benefits that companies might receive from making them.
229
 
Moreover, studies have shown that making facilitation payments, 
regardless of legality, can be very costly for companies from a business 
 
 226. TRACE SURVEY, supra note 33, at 2. 
 227. Bribery Act 2010, 2010, c. 23 (Eng.) [hereinafter UK Bribery Act].  The UK 
Bribery Act will come into force on July 1, 2011. 
 228. See supra notes 143-53 and accompanying discussion. 
 229. It is for this reason that eighty percent of domestic companies have decided that it 
was better to ban making facilitation payments altogether than to continue making them.  
See Fulbright Survey, supra note 154, at 8. 
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expense perspective.
230
  Companies making facilitation payments place 
bullseyes on their foreheads that can be seen by ―entrepreneurial bribe-
takers‖ who will expect further payments in the future and will make even 
greater demands.
231
  These costs on companies can be much higher than 
anticipated and can be a burdensome expense that may forever haunt them. 
Another cost that might be incurred by companies making facilitation 
payments is the cost of dealing with potential government investigations 
and regulatory matters, domestic or foreign, as a result of making such 
payments.  As noted before, companies making facilitation payments are 
likely violating some kind of law, whether it be domestic or foreign, and 
these companies will need to deal with the costly legal expense of 
defending themselves from potential charges, not to mention penalties and 
fines that might be imposed on them, should they be found guilty of any 
violations.
232
 
C. Stay Ahead of a Future Legal Horizon That May Completely Outlaw 
Facilitation Payments 
A third reason why companies should prohibit making facilitation 
payments is that the legal avenue for making such payments is quickly 
fading away.  The building international criticism and regulatory 
frameworks banning facilitation payments have made it increasingly 
difficult or impossible to make facilitation payments without violating 
some kind of law.  Furthermore, the legal permissibility gap that existed for 
facilitation payments back when the FCPA was enacted in 1977 is virtually 
nonexistent today. 
Although five countries currently allow for facilitation payments 
under their foreign anti-bribery laws, the OECD‘s recent calls for an end to 
these payments will likely put pressure on all OECD countries to amend 
and change their laws to eliminate their allowance.  It is this author‘s view 
that the OECD‘s calls will also put pressure on non-signatory nations to the 
Convention to eliminate their allowance as many of these nations may want 
to become signatories to the Convention in the future.  Therefore, most, if 
not all, countries in the world will eventually prohibit the use of facilitation 
payments.  In this respect, the few domestic companies that still engage in 
making facilitation payments should stay ahead of the game and eliminate 
 
 230. TRACE, THE HIGH COST OF SMALL BRIBES, supra note 166, at 8-9; Dutton, supra 
note 129. 
 231. Id. 
 232. See Thomas Fox, What is the Cost of FCPA Compliance (or Non-Compliance)?, 
CORP. COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS, Jun. 3, 2010.  The cost for companies to defend themselves in 
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the practice now so that they will be ready for a potential future regulatory 
landscape that may one day universally prohibit facilitation payments. 
XII. CONCLUSION 
The facilitation payments exception has become a dinosaur remnant of 
a bygone era, a part of a foreign anti-bribery statute in the FCPA that was 
enacted during a time in the 1970s when corruption was prevalent and no 
international treaty existed to prohibit foreign bribery.  It was reasonable 
for the United States to provide an exception for facilitation payments at 
the time, when the main provisions of the FCPA already placed a difficult 
burden on domestic companies, and the elimination of facilitation 
payments would have made the burden much more difficult.  But times 
have changed. 
The United States pushed hard for an international anti-bribery regime 
so that it would no longer be isolated in the fight against foreign bribery 
that left its domestic companies at an unfair disadvantage when competing 
in the global marketplace.  These efforts have been tremendously 
successful and have led to an international anti-bribery environment that 
continues to develop and mature to this very day.  However, these efforts 
have also backfired on the United States, as it now finds itself awkwardly 
criticized by the rest of the world for its own anti-bribery deficiencies 
inherent in the facilitation payments exception.  Rather than fight the 
criticisms, the United States should embrace them and consider eliminating 
the exception once and for all.  That way, the United States can join the rest 
of the world in condemning facilitation payments and fulfill its leadership 
role in the fight against foreign bribery. 
